Agency
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Findings that rest on exhibits naming this entity
- DEF-2.4: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported unanimously in July 2004 that most major key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq "either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting." The Committee found no evidence that administration officials pressured analysts, and found that the CIA's unclassified white paper dropped the Estimate's caveats and its dissenting agencies.
- DEF-2.6: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's 2008 report, approved 10-5, found that most statements by senior officials on Iraq's weapons programs were substantiated by the intelligence available at the time, and that several of them did not convey the intelligence community's disagreement or the limits of its certainty. It found that statements suggesting an Iraq-al-Qa'ida partnership were not substantiated and that statements about Saddam Hussein giving weapons of mass destruction to terrorists were contradicted by the intelligence.
- DEF-6.2: The Church Committee concluded that intelligence activities undermined citizens' constitutional rights primarily because checks and balances had not been applied. Congress then created the Senate and House intelligence committees and enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, with a seven-judge court.
- DEF-6.8: Part Four of the 2002 Joint Inquiry report, commonly called the 28 pages, was withheld in full until 15 July 2016. It reports leads about Saudi-linked contacts with the hijackers, and the Inquiry stated it made no final determinations.
- DEF-6.11: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's 2014 study of the CIA's detention and interrogation program states that Senator Levin's proposal for an independent commission "resulted in concern at the CIA that such a commission would lead to the discovery of videotapes documenting CIA interrogations," that this concern "prompted renewed interest at the CIA to destroy the videotapes," that Levin's amendment failed on 8 November 2005, and that the CIA destroyed the interrogation videotapes the following day.
- POL-7.3: At a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on 17 July 1996, CIA Director John Deutch said CIA policy is not to use accredited American journalists, clergy or Peace Corps members for intelligence purposes, and that the Director or Deputy Director may waive the policy in exceptional circumstances under classified guidelines.
Exhibits naming this entity
- Exhibit 306 19 May 1976. United States Senate: S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., debate and rollcall (creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)
- Exhibit 320 December 2002 (declassified 15 July 2016). U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Joint Inquiry report, Part Four: Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters (declassified in part 15 July 2016)
- Exhibit 386 9 July 2004. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rpt. 108-301
- Exhibit 387 5 June 2008. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information, S. Rpt. 110-345
- Exhibit 850 17 July 1996. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: CIA's Use of Journalists and Clergy in Intelligence Operations, S. Hrg. 104-593
- Exhibit 930 9 December 2014. United States Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program: Foreword, Findings and Conclusions, and Executive Summary, S. Rpt. 113-288
- Exhibit 1110 3 January 2023. Matt Taibbi (@mtaibbi), Twitter thread: The Twitter Files: How Twitter Let the Intelligence Community In (thread, 3 January 2023)