The Lacuna Project

lacuna (n.) a gap in a record where something should be

Independent research. Not affiliated with any government, agency, or company.

Agency

U.S. Department of Defense

Documented positions

  • William J. Lynn III: Senior Vice President, Government Operations and Strategy; registered lobbyist through first quarter 2008, Raytheon (Raytheon Company, Raytheon Technologies, RTX) (earlier – 2008); Deputy Secretary of Defense (nominee; letter to SASC 30 Jan 2009), U.S. Department of Defense (2009 – present)
  • Robert O. Work: Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (2014 – 2017-07); Director (elected 14 Aug 2017; Audit, Public Affairs, Special Activities committees), Raytheon (Raytheon Company, Raytheon Technologies, RTX) (2017-08-14 – present)
  • Ellen M. Pawlikowski: Commander, U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, U.S. Department of Defense (earlier – 2018-09-01); Director (elected 6 Sep 2018), Raytheon (Raytheon Company, Raytheon Technologies, RTX) (2018-09-06 – present)
  • James N. Mattis: Retired from the U.S. Marine Corps, May 2013, U.S. Department of Defense (earlier – 2013-05); Director, General Dynamics (2013-08-07 – 2017); Secretary of Defense (ethics agreement 5 Jan 2017: resign from General Dynamics on confirmation; one-year recusal), U.S. Department of Defense (2017 – 2019-01-01); Director (re-elected), General Dynamics (2019-08-07 – present)
  • Lloyd J. Austin III: Retired from the U.S. Army, May 2016; former Commander, U.S. Central Command (per United Technologies release), U.S. Department of Defense (earlier – 2016-05); Director, United Technologies, then Raytheon Technologies, Raytheon (Raytheon Company, Raytheon Technologies, RTX) (2016-09-01 – 2021-01-22); Secretary of Defense (four-year Raytheon recusal stated in screening memo of 6 May 2021), U.S. Department of Defense (2021-01-22 – present)
  • Mark T. Esper: Raytheon Company position (title not read in a primary document; resigned upon confirmation per ethics agreement of 26 Jul 2017), Raytheon (Raytheon Company, Raytheon Technologies, RTX) (earlier – 2017); Nominee for Secretary of the Army (ethics agreement 26 Jul 2017); later Secretary of the Army and Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (2017 – present)
  • Patrick M. Shanahan: Various positions, last Senior Vice President for Supply Chain and Operations, Boeing (1986-03 – 2017-06); Deputy Secretary of Defense (confirmed 18 Jul 2017; began 19 Jul 2017); Acting Secretary from 1 Jan 2019, U.S. Department of Defense (2017-07-19 – present)

Findings that rest on exhibits naming this entity

  • DEF-1.2: National defense outlays fell from 9.0 percent of GDP in 1960 to 5.5 percent in 1989 and 3.0 percent in 2025. In constant FY2017 dollars they rose from $416.0 billion in 1960 to $595.6 billion in 1989 and $697.2 billion in 2025.
  • DEF-1.3: The Congressional Research Service reported that five companies received 30 percent of Department of Defense contract obligations in fiscal year 2024, out of $445 billion: Lockheed Martin, RTX, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics.
  • DEF-1.8: DoD's April 2023 Contract Finance Study found that defense contractors outperformed commercial counterparts on 8 of 9 key financial metrics while profit margins were somewhat lower, and that cash paid to shareholders rose 73 percent in 2010-2019 compared with 2000-2009 while the share of spending on independent research and development declined.
  • DEF-2.1: The NSA historian Robert Hanyok concluded in a study published in 2001 that no attack on U.S. destroyers occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin on the night of 4 August 1964, and his study confirms the 2 August 1964 engagement with the Maddox. He wrote that the mishandling of the signals intelligence was "not done in a manner that can be construed as conspiratorial" and that NSA personnel believed the attack had happened.
  • DEF-2.3: The Defense Department's Vietnam study, commissioned by Secretary McNamara in 1967 and presented to Secretary Clifford on 15 January 1969, reached the press in June 1971. On 30 June 1971 the Supreme Court held that the government had not met its burden of justifying a prior restraint on publication, and in 2011 the National Archives released the complete report, of which about 34 percent had never been available.
  • DEF-2.10: A Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 13 March 1962, forwarded to the Secretary of Defense as "a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes," listed pretexts for U.S. military intervention in Cuba, including "We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba." Lansdale's memorandum for the record says the President said on 16 March 1962 that "we were not discussing the use of U.S. military force", and the cited records show no approval and no execution of any item.
  • INF-2.4: The Defense Department's Information Operations Roadmap of 30 October 2003 states that information intended for foreign audiences, "including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa."
  • INF-2.5: A Top Secret draft paper by Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton dated 10 March 1965 lists U.S. aims in Vietnam as 70 percent "To avoid a humiliating US defeat," 20 percent to keep South Vietnam and adjacent territory from Chinese hands, and 10 percent to permit the people of South Vietnam a better, freer way of life.
  • INF-2.6: National Security Action Memorandum 328 of 6 April 1965 approved two more Marine battalions and a change of mission for Marine battalions in Vietnam and stated that the President desired the movements "be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy"; on 21 October 1964 President Johnson had said "we are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."
  • INF-2.7: The Army's official history of Vietnam public affairs says the Johnson administration judged "a low profile, achieved through restraints on the press at the scene of conflict" the safer course, records that correspondents called the nightly MACV briefings "The Five O'Clock Follies," and records their final session on 27 January 1973.
  • INF-2.14: The Defense Department Inspector General reported on 9 February 2007 that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced and disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq-al Qaida relationship, and called the actions "not illegal or unauthorized" and "inappropriate."
  • DEF-3.1: The DoD Inspector General issued a disclaimer of opinion on the department-wide financial statements in each of fiscal years 2018 through 2025, eight years in a row. GAO reports that DoD is the only one of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies that has never obtained a clean opinion.
  • DEF-3.2: The FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act required the Department of Defense to validate its financial statements as ready for audit by 30 September 2017, and the FY2014 Act required a full audit of the department's fiscal year 2018 statements, with results due to Congress by 31 March 2019.
  • DEF-3.3: The DoD Inspector General counted 20 agency-wide material weaknesses in fiscal year 2018, 25 in 2019, 26 in 2020, 28 in each of 2021 through 2024, and 26 in 2025. The Inspector General states that comparing these counts from year to year is not a reliable way to measure progress.
  • DEF-3.4: In fiscal year 2025 the DoD Inspector General reported opinions on 21 reporting entities: 11 clean, 1 qualified and 9 disclaimers, up from 5 clean opinions among 21 entities in fiscal year 2018. The Congressional Research Service reports that the entities with disclaimers account for 43 percent of DoD assets.
  • DEF-3.6: An unsupported accounting adjustment is a change to the accounting records that lacks the documentation showing why it was made. In 2018 the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) told the House Armed Services Committee that this is not the same thing as not being able to account for money that Congress has given the department to spend.
  • DEF-3.7: Congress made the full DoD audit annual in the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act and required an unqualified opinion by 31 December 2028 in the FY2024 Act. The FY2024 Act also requires cancellation of 1.5 percent of unobligated amounts for any component that is not independently audited.
  • DEF-3.9: The Defense Department reports progress in its own audit record: the Marine Corps has received a clean opinion since fiscal year 2023, the FY2025 audit report records 121 entity-level material weaknesses and 2,485 notices of findings, which it describes as 427 fewer, and GAO counts one of 17 scope-limiting weaknesses as resolved.
  • DEF-4.2: Three further rules apply to former Defense Department personnel. Certain contracting officials may not take compensation from the contractor for one year (41 U.S.C. § 2104); covered officials must seek a written ethics opinion before contractor employment within two years (FY2008 NDAA § 847); and officers of grade O-9 and above, with civilian equivalents, may not lobby the Department for two years, and O-7 and O-8 officers for one year (FY2018 NDAA § 1045).
  • DEF-4.3: In 2008 the Government Accountability Office reported that 52 major defense contractors employed 2,435 former Defense Department senior and acquisition officials in 2006, and that seven of the firms employed 1,581 of them. The contractors' own data showed 1,263, and GAO described its IRS-based figure as almost twice as many.
  • DEF-4.4: In 2021 GAO reported that 14 major contractors employed 1,718 former Defense Department senior and acquisition officials in 2019. The ten contractors that supplied data reported 816 such officials where GAO's DoD and IRS data identified 1,149, and GAO could not reconcile the difference.
  • DEF-4.5: The DoD Inspector General concluded in 2014 that the Department's database of section 847 ethics opinions was "of marginal value" as a management control system. In 2021 GAO recommended that DoD assess adding the lobbying prohibitions to its acquisition regulation, and DoD concurred.
  • DEF-4.6: The Project On Government Oversight counted 645 instances in 2018 in which the top 20 contractors of fiscal year 2016 employed former senior officials, officers, Members of Congress or senior staff as lobbyists, directors or executives, 562 of them as lobbyists. Senator Warren's staff report of April 2023 counted 672 such cases for 2022, 613 of them registered lobbyists.
  • DEF-4.7: Seven officials are documented moving between Defense Department posts and the boards or payrolls of defense contractors in dated steps from 2009 to 2021, under the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations. Five of them (Lynn, Shanahan, Esper, Mattis and Austin) came to senior Pentagon posts from contractor roles, and four (Work, Pawlikowski, Mattis and Austin) took contractor board seats after leaving DoD posts or the armed services.
  • DEF-4.8: Four officials who came to the Pentagon from contractor roles stated their recusal terms in their own agreements: Shanahan (Boeing), for the duration of his service; Esper (Raytheon), one year, with a continuing limit tied to his deferred compensation; Mattis (General Dynamics), one year; and Austin (Raytheon Technologies), four years. The DoD Inspector General investigated 2019 allegations that Shanahan promoted Boeing and did not substantiate any of them.
  • DEF-4.10: A 2024 study by the Institute for Defense Analyses, commissioned by the DoD Standards of Conduct Office, found no measurable effect of the post-government employment restrictions on recruitment and retention. It also found that well under one percent of retired senior officials are registered lobbyists for the top 100 defense contractors.
  • DEF-5.1: The Costs of War project estimated post-9/11 war spending through fiscal year 2022 at $8.043 trillion, including about $2.2 trillion in future veterans' care, while the Department of Defense's own report lists $1.73 trillion in war-related costs for fiscal years 2001 through 2023.
  • DEF-5.2: No single U.S. government estimate of the total cost of the post-9/11 wars exists.
  • DEF-5.3: CBO estimated that in each year since 2006 more than $50 billion, on average, of funding designated for Overseas Contingency Operations supported enduring activities, and GAO found that the share DoD itself considers non-war rose from about 4 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 12 percent in fiscal year 2015.
  • DEF-5.4: In January 2017 GAO reported that DoD had an internal estimate of $20 to $30 billion in enduring costs funded through OCO and had not finalized it or reported it outside the department.
  • DEF-5.8: In August 2026 GAO reported that DoD components lacked the staff and technology for the blast-exposure cognitive assessments and the industrial hygiene personnel for the exposure tracking that DoD required in August 2024.
  • DEF-5.9: DoD's 2022 Civilian Harm Action Plan states that the U.S. military has not maintained an enterprise-wide, comprehensive database for civilian harm reporting, and in May 2026 the DoD Inspector General found that components fully implemented none of the Plan's objectives by the end of fiscal year 2025.
  • DEF-5.10: The New York Times reported in December 2021 that, among 1,311 CENTCOM civilian-casualty assessments it obtained, investigators visited the strike site in one and interviewed witnesses or survivors in two.
  • POL-7.5: On 26 February 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that Under Secretary Douglas Feith had decided to close the Office of Strategic Influence, said the office had not developed a charter, and answered "It most clearly is not" when asked whether disinformation was among its activities.
  • POL-7.6: The Pentagon's retired military analyst outreach ran from 2002 to February 2008. The Department of Defense Inspector General reported in 2011 that it complied with relevant DOD policies, that "a preponderance of evidence indicates that one RMA stopped receiving invitations because he was a critic," and that 43 of the analysts had defense contractor affiliations.
  • POL-7.7: GAO wrote on 21 July 2009 that "Clearly, DOD attempted to favorably influence public opinion with respect to the Administration's war policies in Iraq and Afghanistan through the RMOs," held that the program did not violate the publicity-or-propaganda prohibition, and recorded that the DOD Inspector General withdrew its first report on the program on 5 May 2009.

Exhibits naming this entity

  • Exhibit 243 1 September 2021. Costs of War Project, Watson Institute, Brown University (Neta C. Crawford): The U.S. Budgetary Costs of the Post-9/11 Wars
  • Exhibit 245 April 2024. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Comptroller: Estimated Cost to Each U.S. Taxpayer for the Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, and Ukraine (Section 1090 Report)
  • Exhibit 247 October 2018. Congressional Budget Office: Funding for Overseas Contingency Operations and Its Impact on Defense Spending
  • Exhibit 248 January 2017. U.S. Government Accountability Office: Overseas Contingency Operations: OMB and DOD Should Revise the Criteria for Determining Eligible Costs and Identify the Costs Likely to Endure Long Term, GAO-17-68
  • Exhibit 249 10 January 2018. U.S. Government Accountability Office: Defense Budget: Obligations of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding for Operation and Maintenance Base Requirements, GAO-18-202R
  • Exhibit 259 15 September 2026. Defense Health Agency, Traumatic Brain Injury Center of Excellence: DOD TBI Worldwide Numbers (with 2000-2025 Q4 report)
  • Exhibit 260 18 August 2026. U.S. Government Accountability Office: Defense Health Care: DOD Should Assess Its Needs for Managing Potential Brain Health Effects from Weapons Blast Exposures, GAO-26-107829
  • Exhibit 262 1 September 2021. Costs of War Project (Neta C. Crawford and Catherine Lutz): Human Cost of Post-9/11 Wars: Direct War Deaths in Major War Zones
  • Exhibit 265 25 August 2022. U.S. Department of Defense: Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan
  • Exhibit 266 March 2024 (published April 2024). U.S. Department of Defense: Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection With United States Military Operations in 2022
  • Exhibit 267 2024. U.S. Department of Defense: CY2023 Annual Report on Civilian Casualties in Connection With U.S. Military Operations
  • Exhibit 268 18 May 2021 (public release December 2021). DoD Office of Inspector General: DODIG-2021-084: USCENTCOM targeting and civilian casualty (CIVCAS) processes evaluation (public redacted version)
  • Exhibit 269 February 2024. U.S. Government Accountability Office: DOD Law of War Policies: Actions Needed to Ensure Proper Reporting and Retention of Alleged Violations, GAO-24-107217
  • Exhibit 270 March 2024. U.S. Government Accountability Office: Civilian Harm: DOD Should Take Actions to Enhance Its Plan for Mitigation and Response Efforts, GAO-24-106257
  • Exhibit 271 13 May 2026. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (secondary title Department of War OIG): Evaluation of the DoW's Implementation of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, DOWIG-2026-084
  • Exhibit 272 18 December 2021. The New York Times (Azmat Khan): Hidden Pentagon Records Reveal Patterns of Failure in Deadly Airstrikes (The Civilian Casualty Files)
  • Exhibit 273 13 June 2018. U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (plaintiff Azmat Khan): Complaint, Khan v. U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Central Command, No. 1:18-cv-05334 (S.D.N.Y.)
  • Exhibit 274 2019. JAMA Surgery (Howard JT and others): Use of Combat Casualty Care Data to Assess the US Military Trauma System During the Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts, 2001-2017
  • Exhibit 275 8 January 2019. DoD Office of Inspector General: Understanding the Results of the Audit of the DoD FY 2018 Financial Statements
  • Exhibit 276 28 January 2020. DoD Office of Inspector General: Understanding the Results of the Audit of the DoD FY 2019 Financial Statements
  • Exhibit 277 23 February 2021. DoD Office of Inspector General: Understanding the Results of the Audit of the DoD FY 2020 Financial Statements
  • Exhibit 278 18 May 2022. DoD Office of Inspector General: Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2021 DoD Financial Statements
  • Exhibit 279 16 May 2023. DoD Office of Inspector General: Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2022 DoD Financial Statements (DODIG-2023-070)
  • Exhibit 280 16 November 2022. DoD Office of Inspector General: Press release: Independent Auditor's Report on the DoD FY 2022 and FY 2021 Basic Financial Statements
  • Exhibit 281 8 August 2024. DoD Office of Inspector General: Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2023 DoD Financial Statements (DODIG-2024-114)
  • Exhibit 282 28 February 2025. DoD Office of Inspector General: Part 1. Understanding the Results of the Audit of the FY 2024 DoD Financial Statements (DODIG-2025-074)
  • Exhibit 283 11 May 2026. Department of War (DoD) Office of Inspector General: The FY 2025 DoW Financial Statement Audit Explained (DOWIG-2026-081)
  • Exhibit 285 10 January 2018. House Committee on Armed Services: Department of Defense Update on the Financial Improvement and Audit Remediation Plan, H.A.S.C. No. 115-64
  • Exhibit 286 25 February 2025. U.S. Government Accountability Office: High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness (GAO-25-107743)
  • Exhibit 287 13 May 2026. U.S. Government Accountability Office: DOD Financial Management: Questions Associated with New Financial Audit Approach (GAO-26-109115)
  • Exhibit 288 September 2025. U.S. Government Accountability Office: DOD Financial Management: Insights into the Auditability of DOD's Fiscal Year 2024 Balance Sheet (GAO-25-108052)
  • Exhibit 289 July 2024. U.S. Government Accountability Office: DOD Financial Management: FY 2023 Financial Statement Audit Progress and Challenges (GAO-24-107478)
  • Exhibit 291 21 July 2023. DoD Office of Inspector General: Management Advisory: DoD's Ability to Financially Report Joint Strike Fighter Inventory (DODIG-2023-096)
  • Exhibit 292 28 April 2026. Congressional Research Service: Defense Primer: FY2025 Department of Defense Audit Results (IF12627)
  • Exhibit 293 28 October 2009. U.S. Congress: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111-84, sec. 1003
  • Exhibit 294 26 December 2013. U.S. Congress: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. 113-66, sec. 1003
  • Exhibit 295 12 December 2017. U.S. Congress: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. 115-91, sec. 1002
  • Exhibit 296 22 December 2023. U.S. Congress: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, Pub. L. 118-31, secs. 920, 1004, 1005
  • Exhibit 297 December 2025. U.S. Congress: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, Pub. L. 119-60, secs. 1002 and 1005
  • Exhibit 298 19 December 2025. Breaking Defense (Valerie Insinna): Pentagon fails (another) audit, restates 2028 goal to finally pass
  • Exhibit 340 2026-11-09. U.S. Department of the Treasury (USAspending.gov API): USAspending query: DoD contract obligations by recipient, FY2019 to FY2025
  • Exhibit 343 April 2026. Office of Management and Budget: Historical Tables, Table 6.1 Composition of Outlays 1940-2031 (FY2027 edition)
  • Exhibit 344 April 2023. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Defense Pricing and Contracting: Department of Defense Contract Finance Study Report
  • Exhibit 345 23 December 1986. U.S. General Accounting Office: Government Contracting: Assessment of the Study of Defense Contractor Profitability (GAO/NSIAD-87-50)
  • Exhibit 351 28 January 2008. United States Congress: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, sec. 847 (ethics opinions for senior DoD officials seeking contractor employment)
  • Exhibit 352 12 December 2017. United States Congress: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, sec. 1045 (lobbying prohibition for former senior DoD personnel)
  • Exhibit 353 21 May 2008. U.S. Government Accountability Office: Defense Contracting: Post-Government Employment of Former DOD Officials Needs Greater Transparency (GAO-08-485)
  • Exhibit 354 9 September 2021. U.S. Government Accountability Office: Post-Government Employment Restrictions: DOD Could Further Enhance Its Compliance Efforts Related to Former Employees Working for Defense Contractors (GAO-21-104311)
  • Exhibit 355 31 March 2014. DoD Office of Inspector General: Section 847 Ethics Requirements for Senior Defense Officials Seeking Employment with Defense Contractors (DODIG-2014-050)
  • Exhibit 356 25 April 2019. DoD Office of Inspector General: Report of Investigation: Mr. Patrick M. Shanahan, Acting Secretary of Defense (DODIG-2019-082)
  • Exhibit 357 5 November 2018. Project On Government Oversight: Brass Parachutes: Defense Contractors' Capture of Pentagon Officials Through the Revolving Door
  • Exhibit 358 April 2023. Senator Elizabeth Warren (staff report): Pentagon Alchemy: How Defense Officials Pass Through the Revolving Door and Peddle Brass for Gold
  • Exhibit 360 26 July 2017. Mark T. Esper to DoD Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Official; posted by U.S. Office of Government Ethics: Ethics agreement of Mark T. Esper, nominee for Secretary of the Army
  • Exhibit 361 5 January 2017. James N. Mattis to DoD Designated Agency Ethics Official; posted by U.S. Office of Government Ethics: Ethics agreement of James N. Mattis, nominee for Secretary of Defense
  • Exhibit 362 January 2009. William J. Lynn III: Letter from William J. Lynn III to Senator John McCain on lobbying for Raytheon
  • Exhibit 363 6 May 2021. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III: Secretary of Defense memorandum: Ethics Obligations and Updated Screening Arrangement
  • Exhibit 371 April 2024. Institute for Defense Analyses (for DoD Standards of Conduct Office): Effects of Certain Ethics Requirements on DOD Hiring, Retention, and Operations (IDA Product 3001788)
  • Exhibit 375 2014. Simon Luechinger and Christoph Moser, Journal of Public Economics 119: 93-107: The value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock market
  • Exhibit 380 4 August 1964 events; published FRUS. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Vol. I, Vietnam 1964, Doc. 276: Editorial Note (Gulf of Tonkin, 4 August 1964)
  • Exhibit 382 30 June 1971. U.S. Supreme Court (per curiam): New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
  • Exhibit 383 2011 (40th anniversary of the 1971 leak). National Archives and Records Administration: Pentagon Papers (Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force)
  • Exhibit 384 10 March 1965. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, FRUS 1964-1968, Vol. II, Vietnam January-June 1965, Doc. 193: Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)
  • Exhibit 396 13 March 1962. Joint Chiefs of Staff (L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman) to the Secretary of Defense: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) (Operation Northwoods memorandum)
  • Exhibit 854 21 November 2011. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General: Review of Matters Related to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) Retired Military Analyst Outreach Activities, DODIG-2012-025
  • Exhibit 855 21 July 2009. U.S. Government Accountability Office: Department of Defense - Retired Military Officers as Media Analysts, B-316443
  • Exhibit 856 26 February 2002. U.S. Department of Defense: Defense Department News Briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (excerpts on the Office of Strategic Influence)
  • Exhibit 857 20 April 2008. The New York Times: Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand (David Barstow), New York Times, p. A1
  • Exhibit 928 11 May 2009. U.S. Department of Defense (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs): Press Conference with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen on Leadership Changes in Afghanistan From the Pentagon
  • Exhibit 929 8 September 2003. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense: Snowflake, Donald Rumsfeld to Steve Cambone, 8 September 2003 (11-L-0559/OSD/18828)
  • Exhibit 1002 30 October 2003; released under FOIA 26 January 2006. U.S. Department of Defense (approved by the Secretary of Defense): Information Operations Roadmap
  • Exhibit 1003 10 March 1965. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian: Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton), 'Action for South Vietnam' (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. II, doc. 193)
  • Exhibit 1004 6 April 1965. White House (McGeorge Bundy): National Security Action Memorandum No. 328, Presidential Decisions Re U.S. Policy in Vietnam (FRUS 1964-1968, vol. II, doc. 242)
  • Exhibit 1006 1988. U.S. Army Center of Military History (William M. Hammond): Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968 (United States Army in Vietnam, CMH Pub. 91-13)
  • Exhibit 1007 1996. U.S. Army Center of Military History (William M. Hammond): Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973 (CMH Pub. 91-2)
  • Exhibit 1020 9 February 2007. U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General: Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Report No. 07-INTEL-04)
  • Exhibit 1241 7 May 2004. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; transcript by FDCH Congressional Hearings: Statement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the treatment of Iraqi prisoners (FDCH transcript)
  • Exhibit 1243 August 2004 (released 24 August 2004). Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (chair James R. Schlesinger), for the Secretary of Defense: Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations (Schlesinger Panel)
  • Exhibit 1264 April 2024. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller): National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2025 (the Green Book), Table 6-1: Department of Defense TOA by Public Law Title
  • Exhibit 1265 September 2017. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction: Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (SIGAR 17-62-LL)
  • Exhibit 1275 15 November 1990. United States Congress: Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-576, sec. 304 (agency financial statement audits)
  • Exhibit 1276 February 1995. U.S. General Accounting Office: High-Risk Series: An Overview (GAO/HR-95-1)
  • Exhibit 1285 September 2021. U.S. Government Accountability Office: Post-Government Employment Restrictions: DOD Could Further Enhance Its Compliance Efforts Related to Former Employees Working for Defense Contractors (GAO-21-104311)