Chapter 2

Official Messaging

Abstract

Governments of both parties have run programs that produce the public account of their own actions. The Committee on Public Information (1917 to 1919) and the Office of War Information (1942 to 1945) were the wartime agencies, and the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act contains no domestic ban, which dates from a 1985 statute. In April 1965 National Security Action Memorandum 328 directed that Marine deployments be understood as consistent with existing policy. The CIA Inspector General found no CIA conspiracy in Contra drug trafficking and also found that CIA acted inconsistently in handling allegations. GAO found propaganda violations in 1987, 2004, 2005 and 2015. The Defense Department Inspector General found the Army's Tillman paperwork misleading and the Pentagon policy office's Iraq assessments inappropriate.

2.1 Wartime agencies and the domestic line

§2.1.1

The Committee on Public Information was created in April 1917 under President Wilson, with George Creel as chairman. Its report to the President is dated 1 June 1919 and was printed in 1920. The report counts 76,000 Four Minute speakers who gave 755,190 speeches. It states that the Committee's Division of News became the "sole medium for the issuance of official war information," that the Committee supervised voluntary censorship of the press, and that it issued an official daily newspaper.

Finding INF-2.1Primary record

The Committee on Public Information's 1920 report says it directed 76,000 Four Minute speakers who gave 755,190 speeches, made its Division of News the "sole medium for the issuance of official war information," and supervised voluntary censorship of the press.

Evidence: Exhibit 997

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

§2.1.2

The report gives its own account of the work. Creel wrote: "We did not call it "propaganda," for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with lies and corruptions." The report also says that "Our work was educational and informative only" and that of 6,000 releases only three were questioned as to accuracy, and inquiry upheld two of these. The figures and the characterization are the chairman's.

Exhibit 997 · Agency report

Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information, 1917: 1918: 1919

We did not call it "propaganda," for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with lies and corruptions.

Creel's report to the President. Counts 76,000 Four Minute speakers and 755,190 speeches; says the Division of News became the sole medium for issuing official war information; says the Committee supervised voluntary censorship of the press and issued an official daily newspaper. Says the Committee did not call its work propaganda. Report dates the creating executive order 14 April 1917.

Source: Committee on Public Information (George Creel); Government Printing Office
Date: 1 June 1919 (GPO 1920)
Quoted from: Report letter, p. 1
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://archive.org/details/completereportof00unit
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Quote read in the archive.org OCR text; hyphenation at line break removed ('corrup- tions'). Other figures: Four Minute Men, p. 3; Division of News, 'sole medium for the issuance of official war information'. The report also says: 'Our work was educational and informative only.' It states that of 6,000 releases only three were questioned as to accuracy, and inquiry upheld two of these.

§2.1.3

President Franklin Roosevelt's Executive Order 9182 of 13 June 1942 consolidated the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of Government Reports and the foreign information functions of the Coordinator of Information into the Office of War Information. Section 4(a) directed it to run information programs "designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the Government." The Director could issue directives binding on departments, require clearance of programs and releases, and require curtailment of information services.

Finding INF-2.2Primary record

Executive Order 9182 of 13 June 1942 created the Office of War Information to run information programs "at home and abroad," and Congress on 12 July 1943 limited its Domestic Operations Branch to $2,750,000 of $33,222,504 and barred it from publishing literature for distribution to the public within the United States.

Evidence: Exhibit 998, Exhibit 999

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

§2.1.4

The 1943 appropriation act, chapter 228, 57 Stat. 531 to 532, gave the Office $33,222,504, of which no more than $24,000,000 was for its Overseas Operations Branch and no more than $2,750,000 for its Domestic Operations Branch. It stated: "No part of this or any other appropriation shall be expended by the Office of War Information for the preparation, or publication of any pamphlet or other literature for distribution to the public within the United States." A further $5,000,000 was available only for activities with military operations. The appropriation sets the Office's domestic limit by statute.

Exhibit 998 · Executive order

Executive Order 9182, Consolidating Certain War Information Functions Into an Office of War Information

Formulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture, and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the Government.

Creates OWI in the Office for Emergency Management by consolidating the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of Government Reports and the foreign information functions of the Coordinator of Information. The Director may issue directives binding on departments, require clearance of programs and releases, and require curtailment of information services.

Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt
Date: 13 June 1942
Quoted from: Sec. 4(a)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-9182-consolidating-certain-war-information-functions-into-office-war
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 999 · Statute

National War Agencies Appropriation Act, 1944, ch. 228, 57 Stat. 494 (Office of War Information, 57 Stat. 531-532)

No part of this or any other appropriation shall be expended by the Office of War Information for the preparation, or publication of any pamphlet or other literature for distribution to the public within the United States.

Appropriates $33,222,504 for OWI salaries and expenses with not more than $24,000,000 for the Overseas Operations Branch and not more than $2,750,000 for the Domestic Operations Branch for listed functions; makes $5,000,000 available only for activities with military operations; bars OWI from preparing or publishing literature for distribution to the public within the United States.

Source: U.S. Congress
Date: 12 July 1943
Quoted from: 57 Stat. 532
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/link/statute/57/531
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Public Law number not read; cite by chapter and Statutes at Large page.

§2.1.5

A common account places the ban on domestic distribution of government information in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. The text of Title V of that Act (Public Law 80-402, 62 Stat. 6) says the Secretary of State may provide for "the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies." It also makes press releases and radio scripts available at the State Department to representatives of the U.S. press and radio and to Members of Congress on request. The text read has no domestic ban.

Finding INF-2.3Primary record

The 1948 Smith-Mundt Act authorizes information activity abroad and contains no ban on domestic distribution; the ban is section 208 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 16 August 1985, which Public Law 112-239 rewrote on 2 January 2013 to permit material made for foreign audiences to be made available in the United States.

Evidence: Exhibit 1000, Exhibit 1001, Exhibit 863

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

§2.1.6

The ban is section 208 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 (Public Law 99-93, 16 August 1985). It states that "no funds authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States, and no program material prepared by the United States Information Agency shall be distributed within the United States." Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013 (Public Law 112-239, 2 January 2013) rewrote 22 U.S.C. 1461 so that the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors may, on request and reimbursement, make material disseminated abroad available in the United States. It also rewrote section 208 to read: "No funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States." Material produced before the effective date is released to the Archivist after 12 years.

Exhibit 1000 · Statute

United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Smith-Mundt Act), Pub. L. 80-402, 62 Stat. 6

The Secretary is authorized, when he finds it appropriate, to provide for the preparation, and dissemination abroad, of information about the United States, its people, and its policies

Title V authorizes the Secretary of State to prepare and disseminate abroad information about the United States; any such press release or radio script is to be available at State for examination by U.S. press and radio representatives and to Members of Congress on request. The text read has no ban on domestic distribution.

Source: U.S. Congress
Date: 27 January 1948
Quoted from: Sec. 501, 62 Stat. 9-10
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-62/pdf/STATUTE-62-Pg6.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 1001 · Statute

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. 99-93, sec. 208 (Ban on domestic activities by the USIA)

no funds authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States, and no program material prepared by the United States Information Agency shall be distributed within the United States.

Section 208 (22 U.S.C. 1461-1a) bars USIA funds from influencing public opinion in the United States and bars distribution of USIA program material within the United States, except as provided in sec. 501 of the 1948 Act and with an exemption for exchange programs. Rewritten by Pub. L. 112-239 sec. 1078 (2013).

Source: U.S. Congress
Date: 16 August 1985
Quoted from: Sec. 208, 99 Stat. 431
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/link/statute/99/405
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Page header on the PDF read as 99 Stat. 431; verify the exact page.

Exhibit 863 · Statute

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 112-239, sec. 1078 (Dissemination Abroad of Information About the United States)

No funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States.

Rewrites 22 U.S.C. 1461 so that State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors may, on request and reimbursement, make materials disseminated abroad available in the United States, and amends sec. 208 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 1986-87, to say no funds authorized for State or the Board 'shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States' while allowing domestic exposure to material made for foreign audiences. Material produced before the effective date is released to the Archivist after 12 years.

Source: U.S. Congress
Date: 2 January 2013
Quoted from: Sec. 1078(c), new sec. 208(a), 126 Stat. 1958
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ239/html/PLAW-112publ239.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

§2.1.7

The Defense Department's Information Operations Roadmap is a 74-page document dated 30 October 2003 and released in part under the Freedom of Information Act on 26 January 2006. It states that Defense Department policy and executive order restrict psychological operations (PSYOP) from targeting American audiences, military personnel and news agencies or outlets. On the audience line it adds that information intended for foreign audiences, "including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa." The document is a Bush administration planning paper.

Finding INF-2.4Primary record

The Defense Department's Information Operations Roadmap of 30 October 2003 states that information intended for foreign audiences, "including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa."

Evidence: Exhibit 1002

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

Exhibit 1002 · Agency planning document

Information Operations Roadmap

information intended for foreign audiences, including public diplomacy and PSYOP, increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience and vice-versa.

74-page classified roadmap (declassified in part). On the foreign/domestic audience line it says PSYOP is restricted by DoD policy and executive order from targeting American audiences, military personnel and news agencies or outlets, and that information intended for foreign audiences increasingly is consumed by the domestic audience and vice versa.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense (approved by the Secretary of Defense)
Date: 30 October 2003; released under FOIA 26 January 2006
Quoted from: Document p. 26 (PDF p. 30)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/info_ops_roadmap.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Scanned PDF; read from OCR of the page image. Release context from National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 177.

2.2 Vietnam

§2.2.1

The Gulf of Tonkin record is in DEF-2.1 and DEF-2.2, and the release of the Pentagon Papers is in DEF-2.3.

§2.2.2

On 10 March 1965 Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton circulated a Top Secret, sensitive draft titled "Action for South Vietnam" to McGeorge Bundy, Unger, McNamara and Vance. The Foreign Relations of the United States dates this draft 10 March, and the figures are often cited to a 24 March version. It lists U.S. aims as 70 percent "To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor)," 20 percent to keep South Vietnam and adjacent territory from Chinese hands, and 10 percent to permit the people of South Vietnam a better, freer way of life. It adds an aim "To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used."

Finding INF-2.5Primary record

A Top Secret draft paper by Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton dated 10 March 1965 lists U.S. aims in Vietnam as 70 percent "To avoid a humiliating US defeat," 20 percent to keep South Vietnam and adjacent territory from Chinese hands, and 10 percent to permit the people of South Vietnam a better, freer way of life.

Evidence: Exhibit 1003

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

§2.2.3

The paper's last recommended item is "(d) Have a contingency plan to downgrade the apparent stakes (per para 8) to be initiated when/if necessary to confuse the issue and diffuse the blame." This is an item in a draft. The exhibit does not show that the plan was adopted or carried out.

Exhibit 1003 · Declassified memorandum (FRUS)

Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton), 'Action for South Vietnam' (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. II, doc. 193)

70%—To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).

Top Secret; Sensitive draft. Lists U.S. aims 70/20/10 and an 'also' aim 'To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.' Its last recommended item is a contingency plan to downgrade the apparent stakes. Copies went to McGeorge Bundy, Unger, McNamara and Vance.

Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian
Date: 10 March 1965
Quoted from: Doc. 193, para. 1
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d193
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Also exact: '(d) Have a contingency plan to downgrade the apparent stakes (per para 8) to be initiated when/if necessary to confuse the issue and diffuse the blame.' The figures are widely cited to a 24 March 1965 version; FRUS dates this draft 10 March.

§2.2.4

National Security Action Memorandum 328 is a Top Secret memorandum of 6 April 1965. It approves an increase of 18,000 to 20,000 in support forces, two additional Marine battalions and a Marine air squadron, and a change of mission for all Marine battalions to permit more active use. Paragraph 11 directs that premature publicity be avoided and that official statements on the troop movements require the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State. It states: "The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy."

Finding INF-2.6Primary record

National Security Action Memorandum 328 of 6 April 1965 approved two more Marine battalions and a change of mission for Marine battalions in Vietnam and stated that the President desired the movements "be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy"; on 21 October 1964 President Johnson had said "we are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."

Evidence: Exhibit 1004, Exhibit 1005

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

Johnson at Akron, 21 October 1964

In campaign remarks at Akron University, Johnson said there were then some 18,000 men in Vietnam and that "we have a choice. We can seek a wider war." He also said: "But we are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."

NSAM 328, 6 April 1965

The memorandum approved additional Marine battalions and a change in their mission. It directed that official statements on the movements be cleared by the Secretary of Defense and that the movements be understood as "gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy."

§2.2.5

The two documents are five and a half months apart. The documents do not refer to each other.

Exhibit 1004 · Declassified memorandum

National Security Action Memorandum No. 328, Presidential Decisions Re U.S. Policy in Vietnam (FRUS 1964-1968, vol. II, doc. 242)

The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy.

Top Secret. Approves an 18-20,000 increase in support forces, two additional Marine battalions and a Marine air squadron, and a change of mission for all Marine battalions to permit more active use. Para. 11 directs that premature publicity be avoided and that official statements on the troop movements require the direct approval of the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

Source: White House (McGeorge Bundy)
Date: 6 April 1965
Quoted from: Para. 11
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d242
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Text matched between the FRUS page and the FAS copy (irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsam-lbj/nsam-328.htm). FRUS notes it is also printed in the Gravel edition, vol. III, pp. 702-703.

Exhibit 1005 · Presidential remarks

Remarks in Memorial Hall, Akron University

But we are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.

Campaign remarks. States there were then some 18,000 men in Viet-Nam and that 'we have a choice. We can seek a wider war.'

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson
Date: 21 October 1964
Quoted from: Remarks, paragraph on Asia and China
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-memorial-hall-akron-university
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

§2.2.6

The Army's Center of Military History published two volumes on public affairs in Vietnam. The first, covering 1962 to 1968, states: "A low profile, achieved through restraints on the press at the scene of conflict and designed to sustain the American public's support for the war, seemed a safer course." It records that Saigon correspondents called the nightly briefings of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "The Five O'Clock Follies," and that Rodger Bankson adjusted briefers and staffing in 1966. The history presents the low profile as a judgment about sustaining public support and describes the 1966 changes as reforms, with more briefers and combat-experienced briefers.

Finding INF-2.7Primary record

The Army's official history of Vietnam public affairs says the Johnson administration judged "a low profile, achieved through restraints on the press at the scene of conflict" the safer course, records that correspondents called the nightly MACV briefings "The Five O'Clock Follies," and records their final session on 27 January 1973.

Evidence: Exhibit 1006, Exhibit 1007

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

§2.2.7

The second volume, covering 1968 to 1973, records that the Office of Information "held the final session of the famous Five O'Clock Follies on 27 January, the day the accord went into effect." More than 385 correspondents were then in South Vietnam.

Exhibit 1006 · Official history

Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968 (United States Army in Vietnam, CMH Pub. 91-13)

A low profile, achieved through restraints on the press at the scene of conflict and designed to sustain the American public's support for the war, seemed a safer course.

Army official history. Says the Johnson administration sought a low profile for the war through restraints on the press; records that Saigon correspondents called the nightly MACV briefings 'The Five O'Clock Follies' and that Rodger Bankson adjusted briefers and staffing in 1966.

Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History (William M. Hammond)
Date: 1988
Quoted from: pp. 12-13
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://archive.org/details/CMHPub91-13
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Follies wording: 'newsmen called them "The Five O'Clock Follies"', p. 239. Read in the archive.org copy of the CMH book (history.army.mil refused scripted access). Verify page numbers against the print.

Exhibit 1007 · Official history

Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973 (CMH Pub. 91-2)

held the final session of the famous Five O'Clock Follies on 27 January, the day the accord went into effect.

Army official history. Records that the MACV Office of Information held the final session of the Five O'Clock Follies on 27 January 1973, the day the accord went into effect, with over 385 correspondents then in South Vietnam.

Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History (William M. Hammond)
Date: 1996
Quoted from: p. 613-614
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://archive.org/details/CMHPub91-2-B
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: OCR text; 'O'CIock' in the OCR corrected to 'O'Clock'.

2.3 The drug-war media campaign

§2.3.1

The Drug-Free Media Campaign Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-277, division D, 21 October 1998) required the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to conduct a national media campaign to reduce and prevent drug abuse among young people. Permitted uses included media time and space and "entertainment industry collaborations." The Act barred use of the funds to supplant pro bono public service time or for partisan purposes, and authorized $195,000,000 for each of fiscal years 1999 through 2002. It stated that the amounts "should be matched by an equal amount of non-Federal funds for the national media campaign, or be matched with in-kind contributions to the campaign of the same value." Public Law 109-469 repealed the Act in 2006.

§2.3.2

GAO's report of 25 August 2006 (GAO-06-818) states that Congress appropriated $1.225 billion for the campaign for fiscal years 1998 through 2004. GAO reviewed the national evaluation by the contractor Westat. It reported no significant favorable effects on marijuana initiation or cessation, and some unfavorable effects in subgroups, and it recommended that Congress consider limiting appropriations.

Finding INF-2.8Primary record

Congress appropriated $1.225 billion for the Office of National Drug Control Policy's youth anti-drug media campaign for fiscal years 1998 through 2004, and GAO reported in 2006 that "the evaluation provides credible evidence that the campaign was not effective in reducing youth drug use."

Evidence: Exhibit 1009, Exhibit 1010

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

§2.3.3

The Office of National Drug Control Policy disagreed in writing. It told GAO it was puzzled that GAO made no recommendations to improve the campaign, generally disagreed with the findings, and argued that the Westat evaluation does not reflect the campaign's effectiveness. GAO answered in its highlights: "We believe the Westat study is sound."

Exhibit 1009 · Statute

Drug-Free Media Campaign Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, div. D, title I, subtitle A (112 Stat. 2681-752 to 2681-753)

Amounts made available under section 105 should be matched by an equal amount of non-Federal funds for the national media campaign, or be matched with in-kind contributions to the campaign of the same value.

Requires the ONDCP Director to conduct a national media campaign to reduce and prevent drug abuse among young people; lists permitted uses including media time and space and 'entertainment industry collaborations'; bars use to supplant pro bono public service time or for partisan purposes; authorizes $195,000,000 for each of FY1999-2002. Repealed by Pub. L. 109-469 (2006).

Source: U.S. Congress
Date: 21 October 1998
Quoted from: Sec. 103(c)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-105publ277/html/PLAW-105publ277.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 1010 · GAO report

ONDCP Media Campaign: Contractor's National Evaluation Did Not Find That the Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign Was Effective in Reducing Youth Drug Use (GAO-06-818)

the evaluation provides credible evidence that the campaign was not effective in reducing youth drug use

Reviews Westat's national evaluation. Reports $1.225 billion appropriated FY1998-FY2004 (p. 9). Finds no significant favorable effects on marijuana initiation or cessation and some unfavorable effects in subgroups. Recommends Congress consider limiting appropriations. ONDCP's written comments generally disagreed.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Date: 25 August 2006
Quoted from: Highlights, 'What GAO Found'
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-06-818
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Read from the Wayback copy of gao.gov/assets/gao-06-818.pdf (page-level extraction; full-text extraction truncated). GAO also wrote 'We believe the Westat study is sound.' (Highlights). ONDCP's written comments said it was 'puzzled' that GAO made no recommendations to improve the campaign.

2.4 The CIA Inspector General and the press

§2.4.1

After the "Dark Alliance" series appeared in the San Jose Mercury News in August 1996, CIA Director John Deutch asked the Inspector General on 3 September 1996 to investigate allegations of connections between the CIA and the Contras in cocaine trafficking to the United States. Volume I, "The California Story," was released in unclassified form on 29 January 1998. A team of 17 reviewed 250,000 pages and conducted over 365 interviews for it. Volume II, "The Contra Story," followed in unclassified form on 8 October 1998. Volume II states that the investigation "was not intended to prove or disprove the allegations" and that its descriptions of allegations are not judgments of their veracity.

§2.4.2

The report's conclusion on conspiracy is a finding. Volume II states: "No information has been found to indicate that CIA as an organization or its employees conspired with, or assisted, Contra-related organizations or individuals in drug trafficking to raise funds for the Contras or for any other purpose." Volume I found no CIA relationship with Ricky Ross, Danilo Blandon or Norwin Meneses. Volume II also states: "No information has been found to indicate that the non-inclusion of narcotics violations by assets in the crimes reporting requirements of the 1982 DoJ-CIA MOU was intended to protect Contra activities."

Finding INF-2.9Primary record

The CIA Inspector General's Volume II report, unclassified on 8 October 1998, found "No information has been found to indicate that CIA as an organization or its employees conspired with, or assisted, Contra-related organizations or individuals in drug trafficking to raise funds for the Contras or for any other purpose," and Volume I found no CIA relationship with Ricky Ross, Danilo Blandon or Norwin Meneses.

Evidence: Exhibit 314, Exhibit 315

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

Exhibit 314 · Inspector general report

Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States, Vol. I, The California Story (96-0143-IG)

A CIA cable indicates that approximately $36,000 seized from Zavala at the time of his arrest was returned to Zavala--based on the claim they were Contra funds--by the prosecutors at CIA's request.

Overview of Volume I; team of 17 reviewed 250,000 pages and conducted over 365 interviews; found no CIA relationship with Ross, Blandon or Meneses, and that $36,000 seized from Zavala was returned at CIA's request per a CIA cable while prosecutors gave other reasons.

Source: CIA Office of Inspector General
Date: 29 January 1998
Quoted from: Vol. I Overview, Conclusions
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/overview.html
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit

Exhibit 315 · Inspector general report

Report of Investigation, Vol. II, The Contra Story (98-0001-IG, unclassified 8 Oct 1998)

No information has been found to indicate that CIA as an organization or its employees conspired with, or assisted, Contra-related organizations or individuals in drug trafficking to raise funds for the Contras or for any other purpose.

Executive Summary and Conclusions. Volume II reviews CIA records on hundreds of Contra organizations and individuals and finds several dozen Contra-related individuals and one Contra organization (the ADREN '15th of September' group) subject to drug-trafficking allegations or information. It finds no information that CIA or its employees conspired with or assisted Contra-related drug trafficking to raise funds, and also finds that CIA acted inconsistently when it received such allegations, did not inform Congress of eight of ten Contra-related individuals during the period of the FY 1987 statutory prohibition, and had no published regulations on contacts with suspected traffickers outside counternarcotics operations. States that the investigation was not intended to prove or disprove the allegations.

Source: CIA Office of Inspector General
Date: 8 October 1998
Quoted from: Vol. II, Executive Summary and Conclusions, Key Findings
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/intro.html
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Introduction: 'The investigation on which Volume II is based was not intended to prove or disprove the allegations or information received by the Agency concerning possible drug trafficking by specific individuals or organizations.' The report also states: 'No information has been found to indicate that the non-inclusion of narcotics violations by assets in the crimes reporting requirements of the 1982 DoJ-CIA MOU was intended to protect Contra activities.' The 'acted inconsistently' finding is carried by exhibit cia-oig-1998-vol2-handling. FAS copy; the original CIA reading room copy should replace it.

§2.4.3

The same volume reports on the Agency's own handling. It states: "CIA acted inconsistently in handling allegations or information indicating that Contra-related organizations and individuals were involved in drug trafficking." Inspector General Frederick Hitz told the House Intelligence Committee on 16 March 1998, on Volume I and a preview of Volume II, that there were instances where CIA did not "in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships" with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking "or take action to resolve the allegations." He also said that six former employees and a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent declined to be interviewed.

Finding INF-2.10Primary record

The same Inspector General reported that "CIA acted inconsistently in handling allegations or information indicating that Contra-related organizations and individuals were involved in drug trafficking," and told the House Intelligence Committee on 16 March 1998 that there were instances where CIA did not "in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships" with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking.

Evidence: Exhibit 315, Exhibit 317

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

§2.4.4

Volume I describes a specific episode. A CIA cable indicates that about $36,000 seized from Zavala at the time of his arrest "was returned to Zavala--based on the claim they were Contra funds--by the prosecutors at CIA's request." The prosecutors gave the Inspector General other reasons: the assistant U.S. attorney and the former U.S. attorney said they returned the money on their own judgment, not on a CIA representation. The report states both accounts.

§2.4.5

The CIA's relationships with American journalists, the February 1976 policy and the 1996 waiver testimony are findings POL-7.2 and POL-7.3 and DEF-6.10. CIA Dispatch 1035-960 of 1 April 1967, which asked certain overseas stations to use "propaganda assets," is POL-7.1.

§2.4.6

The article "Managing a Nightmare: CIA Public Affairs and the Drug Conspiracy Story" was written by Nicholas Dujmovic, a Directorate of Intelligence officer, after December 1997 and approved for release on 29 July 2014. Its opening page states that "a ground base of already productive relations with journalists and an effective response by the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Public Affairs Staff (PAS) helped prevent this story from becoming an unmitigated disaster." It describes calls from journalists, distribution of the Director's letter, and distribution of critical stories to reporters and former officials. It counts skeptical and negative stories. It states: "Public Affairs made sure that reporters and news directors ... received copies of these more balanced stories." It credits critiques published in the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times.

Finding INF-2.11Primary record

An article by a CIA Directorate of Intelligence officer in the Agency's own journal says "a ground base of already productive relations with journalists" and the Public Affairs Staff's response "helped prevent this story from becoming an unmitigated disaster," and describes sending critical stories to reporters and counting skeptical and negative stories.

Evidence: Exhibit 1011

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

§2.4.7

The article also states that Public Affairs "cannot dictate stories to the media" and that its aim is "to inform rather than to pressure or to persuade." It documents contacts, mailings and counts. It does not state that any outlet acted on a CIA instruction.

Exhibit 1011 · Agency journal article

Managing a Nightmare: CIA Public Affairs and the Drug Conspiracy Story

a ground base of already productive relations with journalists and an effective response by the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI) Public Affairs Staff (PAS) helped prevent this story from becoming an unmitigated disaster.

Six-page article by a Directorate of Intelligence officer on the Public Affairs Staff's handling of the 'Dark Alliance' series (August 1996 onward). Describes calls from journalists, distribution of the DCI's letter and of critical stories to reporters and former officials, and counts of skeptical versus negative stories; credits the Washington Post, New York Times and Los Angeles Times critiques; says Public Affairs 'cannot dictate stories to the media.' Calls the series 'a genuine public relations crisis' and records the Mercury News executive editor's May 1997 apology. States that 'The growth in balanced reporting was largely due to the criticisms of the San Jose Mercury-News series by The Washington Post, The New York Times, and especially The Los Angeles Times.'

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Studies in Intelligence (Nicholas Dujmovic)
Date: Written after December 1997; approved for release 29 July 2014
Quoted from: Opening page (reprint p. 1)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001372115
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Image-only PDF read by OCR. Copy used: web.archive.org/web/2020id_/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001372115.pdf (cia.gov redirected scripted requests). Other exact lines: 'Public Affairs cannot dictate stories to the media'; 'the PAS aims above all to inform rather than to pressure or to persuade'; 'Public Affairs made sure that reporters and news directors ... received copies of these more balanced stories.' Further exact wording (page images of the 2014 release): p. 12: 'The growth in balanced reporting was largely due to the criticisms of the San Jose Mercury-News series by The Washington Post, The New York Times, and especially The Los Angeles Times.'; p. 11: 'Public Affairs made sure that reporters and news directors calling for information—as well as former Agency officials, who were themselves representing the Agency in interviews with the media—received copies of these more balanced stories.' The article is one officer's account, not an Agency finding.

2.5 GAO propaganda opinions

§2.5.1

GAO decides whether appropriated funds were used for "publicity or propaganda" under riders in annual appropriations acts. Its test asks whether the material was covert, self-aggrandizing or purely partisan. Politics chapter 7 holds the findings from 2004, 2005 and 2015: unattributed video news releases at HHS, the Office of National Drug Control Policy and Education (POL-7.8), the Armstrong Williams contract (POL-7.9) and the Environmental Protection Agency's Thunderclap campaign (POL-7.10). The 2009 opinion on the Pentagon's retired-analyst program, which found an attempt to influence opinion and no violation, is POL-7.7.

§2.5.2

On 30 September 1987, at the request of Representatives Brooks and Fascell, GAO issued B-229069 on the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (S/LPD), under the Reagan administration. GAO found that the office arranged articles presented as the work of persons not associated with the government, among them a Wall Street Journal op-ed of 11 March 1985 by a paid consultant, and visits through a cut-out. A 13 March 1985 office memorandum quoted in the opinion states: "Officially, this office had no role in its preparation." GAO held that the articles "were misleading as to their origin and reasonably constituted "propaganda" within the common understanding of that term," and that they violated section 501 of the 1985 appropriations act. It did not find the antilobbying statute violated and did not seek recovery of funds.

Finding INF-2.12Primary record

GAO found in B-229069 on 30 September 1987 that the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean arranged articles presented as the work of persons not associated with the government, that they "were misleading as to their origin," and that they violated the publicity-or-propaganda restriction.

Evidence: Exhibit 1012

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

Exhibit 1012 · Legal decision

Department of State, Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, B-229069, 66 Comp. Gen. 707

were misleading as to their origin and reasonably constituted "propaganda" within the common understanding of that term.

Requested by Reps. Brooks and Fascell. Finds S/LPD arranged articles presented as the work of persons not associated with the government (a Wall Street Journal op-ed of 11 March 1985 by a paid consultant) and visits through a cut-out, and that these violated sec. 501 of the 1985 appropriations act (publicity or propaganda). Finds the antilobbying statute not shown to be violated. Does not seek recovery of funds. Cites B-223098 (SBA editorials, 10 October 1986) and B-212069 (6 October 1983).

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (Comptroller General)
Date: 30 September 1987
Quoted from: Opinion, p. 4
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.gao.gov/products/b-229069
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Also exact (p. 2, quoting a 13 March 1985 S/LPD memorandum): 'Officially, this office had no role in its preparation.' Read from the Wayback copy of the GAO PDF by OCR; p. 4 checked against the page image.

§2.5.3

In a memorandum to agencies of 17 February 2005 (B-304272), GAO stated that prepackaged news stories are permissible only if the broadcast discloses that the government prepared them, and that telling the broadcaster is not enough.

Exhibit 1017 · Legal memorandum

Prepackaged News Stories, B-304272

GAO memorandum to agencies: prepackaged news stories are permissible only if the broadcast discloses that the government prepared them; telling the broadcaster is not enough; summarizes the B-302710 and B-303495 violations.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Date: 17 February 2005
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.gao.gov/products/b-304272
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Read as the GAO product page digest; open the PDF and add a quote.

§2.5.4

GAO found no violation in four later opinions. On 30 September 2005 (B-304716) it held that the Administration for Children and Families' payment of a consultant for brochures, a presentation and a signed article was not covert, self-aggrandizing or purely partisan. On 22 August 2018 (B-329504) it found that EPA did not violate the publicity-or-propaganda provision, because the on-screen graphic identified the speaker as EPA's Administrator. On 3 October 2019 (B-330107) it found that an EPA tweet on a Senate confirmation vote was not self-aggrandizing, covert or purely partisan, and recorded that EPA did not respond to its requests for facts and legal views. On 17 June 2020 (B-331262) it found that agency communications about the 2019 Fourth of July events did not violate the provisions.

Exhibit 1013 · Legal decision

Department of Health and Human Services, Contract with Maggie Gallagher, B-304716

GAO finds the Administration for Children and Families' payment of a consultant for brochures, a presentation and a signed article did not violate the publicity-or-propaganda prohibition (not covert, self-aggrandizing or purely partisan).

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Date: 30 September 2005
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.gao.gov/products/A38960
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Read as the GAO product page digest; open the PDF and add a quote.

Exhibit 1014 · Legal decision

Environmental Protection Agency, Application of Publicity or Propaganda and Anti-Lobbying Provisions to Then-Administrator's Appearance in a Trade Association's Video, B-329504

GAO finds EPA did not violate the publicity-or-propaganda, grassroots lobbying or Interior anti-lobbying provisions; the on-screen graphic identified the speaker as EPA's Administrator.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Date: 22 August 2018
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.gao.gov/products/b-329504
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Read as the GAO product page digest; open the PDF and add a quote.

Exhibit 1015 · Legal decision

Environmental Protection Agency, Application of a Publicity or Propaganda Provision to an EPA Tweet, B-330107

GAO finds an April 2018 EPA tweet on a Senate confirmation vote naming a political party was not self-aggrandizing, covert or purely partisan and did not violate sec. 718 of the FY2018 appropriations act. EPA did not respond to GAO's requests for facts and legal views.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Date: 3 October 2019
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.gao.gov/products/b-330107
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Read as the GAO product page digest; open the PDF and add a quote.

Exhibit 1016 · Legal decision

Executive Agencies, Communications about the 2019 Fourth of July Events on the National Mall, B-331262

GAO finds agency communications about the 2019 Fourth of July events did not violate the grassroots-lobbying or publicity-or-propaganda provisions (secs. 715 and 718 of the FY2019 act).

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Date: 17 June 2020
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.gao.gov/products/b-331262
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Read as the GAO product page digest; open the PDF and add a quote.

§2.5.5

GAO's violation findings fall under Presidents Reagan (1987), George W. Bush (2004 and 2005) and Obama (2015). The 2005 video news releases and the Pentagon retired-analyst program belong to one administration.

2.6 Pentagon accounts

§2.6.1

The closure of the Office of Strategic Influence on 26 February 2002 is POL-7.5. The retired-analyst outreach of 2002 to February 2008, the Inspector General's 2011 review and GAO's 2009 opinion are POL-7.6 and POL-7.7. The Iraq weapons-of-mass-destruction record, including the Senate Intelligence Committee reports and the Commission of 2005, is DEF-2.4 to DEF-2.6.

§2.6.2

On 24 April 2007 the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a hearing titled "Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes." Thomas Gimble, the acting Defense Department Inspector General, testified on the Tillman case that the Army's three investigations were deficient and that officials failed to notify next of kin promptly. He stated that "responsible officials failed to comply with the Army Military Award Regulation when they submitted a Silver Star recommendation that included inaccurate information and a misleading citation that implied Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire."

Finding INF-2.13Primary record

The Defense Department Inspector General told the House Oversight Committee on 24 April 2007 that the Army's three investigations of Corporal Pat Tillman's death were deficient and that officials submitted a Silver Star recommendation "that included inaccurate information and a misleading citation that implied Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire."

Evidence: Exhibit 1018

Mechanism: Managing the narrative

§2.6.3

The testimony attributes the errors to named officials in the chain of command and does not state an intent.

Exhibit 1018 · Congressional hearing

Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes, Hearing before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 110-54

responsible officials failed to comply with the Army Military Award Regulation when they submitted a Silver Star recommendation that included inaccurate information and a misleading citation that implied Corporal Tillman died by enemy fire.

Witnesses include Jessica Lynch, Tillman family members, Spec. Bryan O'Neal, and Acting DoD Inspector General Thomas Gimble. Gimble reports the Army's three Tillman investigations were deficient, officials failed to notify next of kin promptly, and the Silver Star recommendation was inaccurate; and that the CENTCOM IG found no evidence the Lynch rescue was staged and that no public affairs personnel planned or filmed it. Chairman Waxman says the committee still does not know who supplied the 3 April 2003 account.

Source: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Date: 24 April 2007
Quoted from: Statement of Thomas F. Gimble, hearing pp. 74-76
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg42898/html/CHRG-110hhrg42898.htm
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Other exact lines: Lynch, 'They don't need to be told elaborate lies.' (pp. 23-24; the statement also says of the early stories 'It was not true.'); Gimble, 'The Inspector General of the Central Command determined and we concur that the allegations were not substantiated. No evidence was found that the rescue was a staged media event.'; Rep. Tom Davis, 'never fed or perpetuated the Hollywood version of events' (p. 12). Page numbers from the GPO PDF page headers; spot-check.

§2.6.4

The Defense Department Inspector General's Report 07-INTEL-04 of 9 February 2007 was requested by Senators Roberts and Levin. It found that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced and disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the relationship between Iraq and al Qaida. It states that the actions were "not illegal or unauthorized" and were "in our opinion, inappropriate," because the products "did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community." The Office of Special Plans "had no responsibility for and did not perform any of the activities examined."

Finding INF-2.14Primary record

The Defense Department Inspector General reported on 9 February 2007 that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy developed, produced and disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq-al Qaida relationship, and called the actions "not illegal or unauthorized" and "inappropriate."

Evidence: Exhibit 1020

Mechanism: Managing the narrative, The filtered record

§2.6.5

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not concur. The response said the activities were not intelligence activities, were directed by the Deputy Secretary, and were consistent with the Director of Central Intelligence's own 2002 statements to Congress. The Inspector General's evaluation response kept its finding.

Exhibit 1020 · Inspector general report

Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Report No. 07-INTEL-04)

While such actions were not illegal or unauthorized, the actions were, in our opinion, inappropriate given that the products did not clearly show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community and were, in some cases, shown as intelligence products.

Requested by Sens. Roberts and Levin. Finds the policy office developed, produced and disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq-al Qaida relationship. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not concur; the IG's evaluation response kept the finding. The Office of Special Plans itself 'had no responsibility for and did not perform any of the activities examined.'

Source: U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
Date: 9 February 2007
Quoted from: Results (as quoted in S. Rept. 110-346, Scope and Methodology, pp. 1-2)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Audits-and-Evaluations/Article/1142221/review-of-pre-iraqi-war-activities-of-the-office-of-the-under-secretary-of-defe/
Accessed: 2026-11-10
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Quote read in the Senate Intelligence Committee's quotation of the report (OCR of S. Rept. 110-346). The unclassified executive summary transcription on GlobalSecurity.org has a different second half ('given that the intelligence assessments were intelligence products and did not clearly show the variance...'). Check against the DoD OIG PDF before publication.

Key findings

The Committee on Public Information's 1920 report counts 76,000 Four Minute speakers and calls its news division the "sole medium for the issuance of official war information" (2.1).
Congress capped the Office of War Information's domestic branch at $2,750,000 in 1943 and barred it from publishing literature for the U.S. public (2.2).
The domestic ban on foreign-audience material dates from section 208 of the 1985 Foreign Relations Authorization Act and was rewritten in 2013; the 1948 Smith-Mundt text has no such ban (2.3).
The 2003 Information Operations Roadmap says foreign-audience information "increasingly is consumed by our domestic audience" (2.4).
A 10 March 1965 draft lists U.S. aims in Vietnam as 70 percent to avoid a humiliating defeat (2.5).
NSAM 328 asked that the April 1965 Marine deployments be understood as consistent with existing policy, after Johnson's Akron remark of October 1964 (2.6).
The Army's history records a "low profile" built on press restraints and the "Five O'Clock Follies" briefings (2.7).
Congress appropriated $1.225 billion for the youth anti-drug media campaign, and GAO found credible evidence it was not effective in reducing youth drug use (2.8).
The CIA Inspector General found no CIA conspiracy or assistance in Contra drug trafficking to raise funds (2.9).
The same Inspector General found that CIA acted inconsistently in handling drug allegations about Contra-related individuals (2.10).
A CIA journal article credits a "ground base of already productive relations with journalists" for the Agency's press response in 1996 and 1997 (2.11).
GAO found in 1987 that the State Department's public diplomacy office arranged articles presented as the work of unaffiliated persons (2.12).
The Defense Department Inspector General found the Tillman Silver Star recommendation included inaccurate information and a misleading citation (2.13).
The Defense Department Inspector General called the policy office's alternative Iraq assessments "inappropriate" and "not illegal or unauthorized" (2.14).

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