Exhibit 1190 ยท Journal article
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power.
A formal model in which a change in political institutions shifts de jure power while elites invest in de facto power (lobbying, paramilitary force) to offset it, producing "captured democracy" and persistence of economic institutions. Illustrated with the U.S. South, Latin America and Liberia. Full AER paper read (Robinson's author-hosted copy); the NBER 2006 working paper has different wording.
- Source
- Acemoglu and Robinson, American Economic Review 98(1):267-293
- Date
- March 2008
- Quoted from
- Abstract, p. 267
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.267
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Standing note: a formal model plus historical illustrations, not a test. The same authors' wider program is contested (Albouy, AER 2012, on the settler-mortality instrument: exhibit albouy-2012-colonial-origins-comment). Use the 2008 paper as a mechanism for "reforms change rules and leave the coalition".