Exhibit 1227 ยท Peer-reviewed article
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite.
A model in which a change in political institutions alters de jure power but invites investment in de facto power that partly or fully offsets it, so economic institutions can persist after a regime change.
- Source
- Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, American Economic Review 98(1):267-293
- Date
- March 2008
- Quoted from
- Abstract (RePEc/IDEAS record of the AER article)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.267
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Theoretical model; abstract read only. The factual claim about any historical case (Acemoglu and Robinson cite the post-bellum US South) is not verified here.