Exhibit 1233 ยท Peer-reviewed article (working-paper abstract read)
Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians (NBER Working Paper 22443, 2016; Journal of Political Economy 126(5):1912-1964, 2018)
We find that being audited in the past reduces future corruption by 8 percent, while also increasing the likelihood of experiencing a subsequent legal action by 20 percent.
Using Brazil's random audits of municipalities, the authors find that being audited in the past reduces later corruption and raises the chance of a later legal action, and that most of the reduction comes through higher perceived non-electoral costs of corruption.
- Source
- Eric Avis, Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan
- Date
- July 2016 (working paper); October 2018 (journal)
- Quoted from
- Abstract, NBER Working Paper 22443 (July 2016)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://www.nber.org/papers/w22443
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Text read is the NBER abstract; JPE wording unchecked. The effect depends on audits leading to legal action, which links to audit with sanction.