Exhibit 1232 ยท Peer-reviewed article
Monitoring Corruptible Politicians
these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits, even while mayors in these benefit from higher reelection rates.
Using longitudinal audit data from Puerto Rico's municipalities, the authors find corruption is lower when audits arrive before an election but is not lower in later audits, and conclude audits help voters choose responsive but corruptible politicians.
- Source
- Gustavo J. Bobonis, Luis R. Camara Fuertes and Rainer Schwabe, American Economic Review 106(8):2371-2405
- Date
- August 2016
- Quoted from
- Abstract (RePEc/IDEAS record of the AER article)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130874
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Abstract read only. This is the best direct evidence found of audit effects that do not carry forward. One jurisdiction.