Exhibit 692 · Journal article
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
We model lobbying not as exchange (vote buying) or persuasion (informative signaling) but as a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of policy information, political intelligence, and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators.
Abstract read via EconPapers.
- Source
- Hall and Deardorff, American Political Science Review 100(1):69-84
- Date
- 2006
- Quoted from
- Abstract
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/lobbying-as-legislative-subsidy/AE4B5D8AB9C2487BB78C2A51BB53E03F
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit