Exhibit 1179 ยท Working paper (not peer reviewed as read)
Funding and Incentives of Regulators: Evidence from Banking
Using a novel dataset on fees and regulatory actions, we find that firms that pay higher fees face more lenient regulation, which leads to a buildup of risk.
Uses kinks in the fee schedules of federal bank regulators (OCC and the other federal supervisors) to compare banks just above and below a fee threshold. Banks that pay higher fees face more lenient regulation, take on more risk, and later have more loan defaults and regulatory actions. It is the closest direct test of fee-funded leniency in the literature found. Abstract and introduction read; publication in a journal not confirmed.
- Source
- Roni Kisin and Asaf Manela, working paper (18 November 2016; SSRN 2527638)
- Date
- 18 November 2016
- Quoted from
- Abstract, p. 1
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://jhfinance.web.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/12369/2016/11/2017JH_regulators20160517.pdf
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Standing note: regression kink design, identification depends on kink exogeneity. It compares fee payers with each other inside a fee-funded system, not fee-funded with appropriations-funded regulators. Cite only after checking for a published version; otherwise flag as a working paper.