Exhibit 1175 ยท Working paper (not peer reviewed as read)
The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation
These results appear inconsistent with a "quid-pro-quo" explanation of the revolving door, but consistent with a "regulatory schooling" hypothesis.
Career data on federal and state bank regulators. Outflows to the private sector rise in booms and net flows into regulation are countercyclical; the authors say the pattern is inconsistent with a quid-pro-quo reading of the revolving door and consistent with "regulatory schooling". Abstract read (OpenAlex).
- Source
- Lucca, Seru and Trebbi, NBER Working Paper 20241
- Date
- June 2014
- Quoted from
- Abstract
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.3386/w20241
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Standing note: descriptive flows, not an effect on enforcement. Published version not located in this pass (check JME). Use with Agarwal et al. 2014 as the revolving-door null; Lacuna's ledger documents moves, and this literature does not show the moves change outcomes.