Exhibit 385

National Intelligence Estimate 2002-16HC: Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction

Exhibit 385 · National Intelligence Estimate

National Intelligence Estimate 2002-16HC: Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction

INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment.

Key judgments with the Energy Department, State/INR and Air Force dissents, and the confidence levels table assigning low confidence to whether Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with al-Qa'ida.

Source: National Intelligence Council (U.S. intelligence community)
Date: October 2002 (released copy marked April 2004)
Quoted from: State/INR Alternative View, pp. 8-9 (printed)
Grade: Primary record
Document: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/nie.pdf
Accessed: 2026-11-09
Cited by: Findings citing this exhibit
Note: Redacted release (MORI DocID 1075566). Key judgment quoted in notes: p. 5.

Cited by

Finding DEF-2.4: Primary record The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported unanimously in July 2004 that most major key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq "either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting." The Committee found no evidence that administration officials pressured analysts, and found that the CIA's unclassified white paper dropped the Estimate's caveats and its dissenting agencies.