Exhibit 1226 ยท Peer-reviewed article
Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail: Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem
in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal-agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted.
From interviews in Kenya and Uganda, the authors argue that anticorruption reforms built on a principal-agent model break down where corruption is systemic, because in those settings corruption resembles a collective action problem and there are no noncorruptible principals to enforce the reform.
- Source
- Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein and Jan Teorell, Governance 26(3):449-471
- Date
- July 2013
- Quoted from
- Abstract (Lund University Research Portal record, lup.lub.lu.se/record/3630113)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Quote uses a hyphen where the abstract prints an en dash in 'principal-agent'. Abstract read only. Evidence base is an interview study in two countries. Marquette and Peiffer (Governance 2018) argue the two frameworks are complementary; not read.