Exhibit 1197 ยท Commission report
Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, vol. 1, ch. V: The Contributing Cause of the Accident (Findings, p. 104)
The Commission concluded that the Thiokol Management reversed its position and recommended the launch of 51-L, at the urging of Marshall and contrary to the views of its engineers in order to accommodate a major customer.
Chapter V finds that the decision to launch 51-L was flawed, that waivers of launch constraints were not considered at all levels, that Marshall management tended to contain serious problems internally, and that Thiokol management reversed its no-launch position at Marshall's urging. The 27 January 1986 teleconference had no safety representative.
- Source
- Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission)
- Date
- 1986
- Quoted from
- Chapter V, Findings item 4, p. 104
- Grade
- Primary record
- Document
- https://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Opening statement at p. 82: "The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed." Finding 1 at p. 104 says a well-structured system emphasizing safety "would have flagged the rising doubts about the Solid Rocket Booster joint seal." NASA History Office HTML edition; page numbers are the bracketed report pages.