Exhibit 1163 ยท Journal article
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Regulation may be actively sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon it. A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.
Frames regulation as a good the political process supplies to groups able to pay in votes and resources, and argues that small, concentrated groups win it because organizing costs and free-riding fall on diffuse groups. Stigler also holds that "the truly intended effects should be deduced from the actual effects" of a policy (from his 1975 supplementary note, as quoted in Carpenter and Moss 2014 intro, p. 8), an inference Carpenter and Moss criticize. Read in a text copy (Wayback capture of an SJSU course page) that carries no page numbers.
- Source
- George J. Stigler, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1):3-21
- Date
- Spring 1971
- Quoted from
- Opening section, third paragraph (original p. 3; the text copy read has no page numbers)
- Grade
- Peer-reviewed
- Document
- https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160
- Accessed
- 2026-11-10
- Cited by
- Findings citing this exhibit
- Note
- Standing note: influential and testable in form, mixed in tests (Peltzman 1976 generalized it; Dal Bo 2006 reviews the record as mixed). Main criticism is Stigler's inference rule, which reads purpose off outcomes (Carpenter and Moss 2014, p. 8, citing Noll on the "lurking danger of tautology"). Lacuna's purpose-inversion frame must not lean on that rule alone.