The Lacuna Project

lacuna (n.) a gap in a record where something should be

Independent research. Not affiliated with any government, agency, or company.

Agency

U.S. Congress

Documented positions

  • Bill Archer: Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (Republican, Texas), U.S. Congress (1971 – 2001); Registered lobbyist for the Homeland Investment Coalition, filed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (LD-2 covered position 'HOUSE MEMBER'), Homeland Investment Coalition (2003-02 – 2005)

Findings that rest on exhibits naming this entity

  • AGR-1.1: The Food Additives Amendment of 1958 makes a food additive unsafe unless an FDA regulation or exemption covers it, and it excludes from the definition of food additive any substance generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience, as safe for its intended use. The statute does not say who the experts are or that a company must tell FDA of its conclusion.
  • POL-1.1: The Lobbying Disclosure Act database returned 14,922 mid-year filings for 2004, 16,046 mid-year and 16,406 year-end filings for 2005, and 18,107 first-quarter filings for 2023. These are counts of filings and carry no dollar amounts.
  • POL-1.2: The 2004 repatriation provision taxed repatriated foreign dividends at an effective rate of 5.25 percent, and corporations repatriated $312 billion under it.
  • POL-1.3: The 2004 American Jobs Creation Act conference report passed the House 280 to 141 and the Senate 69 to 17, with yea votes from Republicans and Democrats in both chambers.
  • POL-1.7: CRS reports that studies generally find the repatriated funds went to shareholders through stock repurchases. Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes estimate $0.91 of repurchases per $1 repatriated in their working paper.
  • POL-1.8: A Democratic majority-staff report of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found that the top 15 repatriating corporations cut a net 20,931 U.S. jobs from 2004 to 2007 and raised stock buybacks 16 percent from 2004 to 2005 and 38 percent from 2005 to 2006.
  • POL-1.12: On 24 May 2010 the Senate voted 60 to 30 on a motion by Senator Brownback to instruct conferees to exempt motor vehicle dealers from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Yea votes came from both parties.
  • POL-1.17: Ballard Partners reported $88.06 million in lobbying income for 2025 and $19.27 million for 2024. For the first three quarters of 2026 it reported $97.27 million: $30.15 million, $32.23 million and $34.89 million.
  • POL-1.18: Among the large firms whose filings were pulled in full, the largest single-firm annual lobbying income was $36.23 million (Akin Gump, 2016), $39.08 million (Akin Gump, 2017), $56.35 million (Brownstein Hyatt, 2021), $67.88 million (Brownstein Hyatt, 2024) and $88.06 million (Ballard Partners, 2025).
  • POL-1.19: RAI Services Company has been a Ballard client every year from 2017. It paid $440,000 in each of 2017, 2018 and 2019, $560,000 in 2025 and $550,000 for the first three quarters of 2026. In 2025 it reported 20 outside lobbying firms with $3.445 million in income, and Ballard's fee was the largest.
  • DEF-2.1: The NSA historian Robert Hanyok concluded in a study published in 2001 that no attack on U.S. destroyers occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin on the night of 4 August 1964, and his study confirms the 2 August 1964 engagement with the Maddox. He wrote that the mishandling of the signals intelligence was "not done in a manner that can be construed as conspiratorial" and that NSA personnel believed the attack had happened.
  • DEF-2.9: At a Senate hearing on 11 February 2020 senators quoted SIGAR interview records in which Lute, in 2015, said "We were devoid of a fundamental understanding of Afghanistan--we didn't know what we were doing." Senators also quoted Boucher on seeking "the unachievable" and Crowley on the presentation of altered data. At the same hearing the Special Inspector General, Sopko, testified that "every time we find something that looks like it is going negative, it gets classified or it is no longer relevant."
  • INF-2.2: Executive Order 9182 of 13 June 1942 created the Office of War Information to run information programs "at home and abroad," and Congress on 12 July 1943 limited its Domestic Operations Branch to $2,750,000 of $33,222,504 and barred it from publishing literature for distribution to the public within the United States.
  • INF-2.3: The 1948 Smith-Mundt Act authorizes information activity abroad and contains no ban on domestic distribution; the ban is section 208 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 16 August 1985, which Public Law 112-239 rewrote on 2 January 2013 to permit material made for foreign audiences to be made available in the United States.
  • INF-2.8: Congress appropriated $1.225 billion for the Office of National Drug Control Policy's youth anti-drug media campaign for fiscal years 1998 through 2004, and GAO reported in 2006 that "the evaluation provides credible evidence that the campaign was not effective in reducing youth drug use."
  • POL-2.1: Gilens and Page analyzed 1,779 survey-polled proposed policy changes from 1981 to 2002 and tested whether adoption within four years followed the preferences of the 50th income percentile, the preferences of the 90th income percentile, or a Net Interest-Group Alignment index. With all three in one model, the 50th-percentile coefficient was .03 and not significant, against .76 for the 90th percentile and .56 for interest groups.
  • POL-2.2: In the Gilens-Page data the preferences of the 50th and 90th income percentiles correlate at .78 after measurement-error correction, and the model's R-squared is .074. The authors write that average citizens often get the policies they want as coincidental beneficiaries, and that their evidence does not indicate that the average citizen always loses out.
  • POL-2.3: Bashir reproduced the Gilens-Page estimates and simulated the estimator. With the 50th and 90th percentile preferences correlated at .78, a true median-income coefficient of about 0.4 was estimated as essentially zero in over 20 percent of trials.
  • POL-2.4: In the 185 of 1,779 Gilens-Page cases where the median-income and affluent majorities took opposite sides, the median-income side got its preferred outcome 47 percent of the time and the affluent side 53 percent. Gilens and Page accept these figures.
  • POL-2.5: Gilens and Page report that when only the affluent strongly supported a change, at 75 percent support or 25 percent opposition, it was adopted 46 percent of the time, and when only the middle class strongly supported it, 24 percent of the time. When the affluent strongly opposed a change the middle class did not, adoption was 4 percent, and in the reverse case 40 percent.
  • POL-2.6: Enns found that support for proposed policies among the 50th and 90th income percentiles correlates at r=.94, and at r=.68 among the 18 percent of policies where the two groups differ by more than 10 points. About 66 percent of adoption values predicted from middle-income preferences fall inside the 95 percent intervals of the values predicted from affluent preferences.
  • POL-2.7: In the 1999 to 2002 surveys of the Gilens data, Enns found that the preferences of Strong Republicans predicted policy adoption (b=.79) and the preferences of Strong Democrats did not (b=.10). Enns describes the period as one of Republican control of Congress.
  • POL-2.8: Bartels analyzed Senate roll calls from 1989 to 1994 and reported responsiveness to constituents in the middle and upper income thirds and no evidence of responsiveness to the bottom third. His abstract reports that the bottom fifth receives little or no weight, especially from Republican senators.
  • POL-2.10: Elkjaer and Iversen compared preferred levels of fiscal and redistributive policy with policy in advanced democracies, including the United States, and found that policy aligns with middle-class interests. Their simulations show that models of policy change on preferences for change can credit the rich with influence when the rich are only better informed.
  • POL-2.11: A systematic review of 1,163 estimates from 25 studies found a positive income gradient in responsiveness with wide variation. The predicted probability of an extreme pro-rich result is .59 in models that enter several income groups together and .08 in models run separately.
  • POL-2.12: In the United States studies in the same review, both parties respond more to the rich than to the poor. Democrats overrepresent the poor relative to Republicans, with study-level probabilities of .27 against .12, and partisanship does not change the finding that the rich are overrepresented relative to the middle class.
  • POL-2.13: Baumgartner and colleagues studied 98 issues drawn from interviews with registered lobbyists and report that 60 percent of lobbying campaigns failed to change policy. Measured resources explain less than 5 percent of the difference between successful and unsuccessful efforts.
  • POL-2.15: The Gilens-Page elite coefficient attaches to the 90th income percentile, about $146,000 in household income. No cited source measures the policy preferences of the top 1 percent across issues and years, so the effect cannot be assigned to the very rich.
  • POL-2.16: The Gilens-Page data cannot show whether proposals the middle class favors and the affluent oppose fail by being kept off the agenda or by being voted down.
  • REL-2.8: In November 1784 the Virginia House of Delegates agreed, 47 to 32, that the people ought to pay a moderate annual tax for the support of the Christian religion or of some Christian church, and in January 1786 the General Assembly enacted that no man "shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever."
  • AGR-3.12: P.L. 119-21 (4 July 2025) set higher statutory reference prices from crop year 2025, allocated up to 30,000,000 additional base acres, raised the payment limit from $125,000 to $155,000 with inflation indexing, and defined partnerships, S corporations and LLCs as qualified pass-through entities. It also raised the premium subsidy for area-based crop insurance coverage from 65 to 80 percent and raised five other premium support rates by 3 to 5 percentage points.
  • AGR-3.13: CBO estimated that Title I of P.L. 119-21 reduces outlays by $121 billion over fiscal years 2025 to 2034, with nutrition changes reducing outlays by $187 billion and other agriculture subtitles adding a net $66 billion. CRS reports that the nutrition title makes up about 72 percent of farm bill mandatory spending in CBO’s February 2026 baseline.
  • AGR-3.15: Original quarterly lobbying reports naming the farm bill in an activity description came from 716 clients in 2018, 1,003 clients in 2024 and 746 clients in 2025.
  • POL-4.1: The STOCK Act, signed 4 April 2012, states that members and employees of Congress owe a duty of trust and confidence over material nonpublic information derived from their positions, and requires each covered transaction to be reported within 30 days of notification and no later than 45 days after the transaction.
  • POL-4.2: A filer more than 30 days late owes a $200 fee that the supervising ethics office may waive in extraordinary circumstances, and each congressional ethics committee must refer to the Attorney General any individual it has reasonable cause to believe willfully failed to file.
  • POL-4.3: Public Law 113-7, signed 15 April 2013, ended the online-posting requirement for congressional staff disclosure forms and kept it for members and candidates; staff remain subject to the reporting duty.
  • POL-4.8: A study of Senators' trades in 1993-1998 found that a portfolio copying their purchases beat the market by 85 basis points per month, and a study of House trades in 1985-2001 found that a portfolio copying their purchases beat it by 55 basis points per month.
  • POL-4.9: Karadas (2019) and Hall, Karadas and Schlosky (2017) found abnormal returns in members' trades in 2004-2010 concentrated among powerful members, and Karadas and Huang and Xuan (2018, a working paper on 2010-2013) found them absent after the 2012 Act.
  • POL-4.10: Eggers and Hainmueller (2013) found no information advantage in 1985-2001 or 2004-2008 and found that the average member's 2004-2008 portfolio would have earned more in an index fund, and Belmont and colleagues (2022) found no superior performance in 2012-2020, including among senators accused of informed trading.
  • POL-4.11: Studies of the period after 2012 disagree: Chen and Sacerdote (2026) find 2012-2023 portfolios underperform or at best match benchmarks, Belmont and colleagues (2020) report that stocks senators sold after the 24 January 2020 briefing underperformed the market by 9 percent, and Wei and Zhou (2025) find that lawmakers outperform peers by 47 percentage points a year after reaching party leadership.
  • POL-4.16: The House passed H.R. 7008 on 22 July 2026 by 232-198, with Republicans 218-0 and Democrats 13-198, and the Senate rejected cloture on 30 September 2026 by 53-47, with Republicans 53-0 and Democrats and Independents 0-47.
  • REL-4.1: Federal law excepts churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches from the notice requirement for applying for IRS recognition of exemption (26 U.S.C. § 508(c)(1)(A)) and from filing the annual information return, Form 990 (26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i)).
  • REL-4.2: The Church Audit Procedures Act of 1984 (26 U.S.C. § 7611) permits the IRS to begin a church tax inquiry only on a written reasonable belief held by an appropriate high-level Treasury official and written notice to the church, and requires written approval of regional counsel before a revocation, deficiency notice or assessment. Congress enacted it after a 1983 Senate hearing at which the chairman cited constitutional entanglement and the harm of extended examinations to small congregations.
  • REL-4.8: On 7 July 2025 the IRS and the plaintiffs in National Religious Broadcasters v. Long jointly asked a federal court to declare that a house of worship speaking to its congregation through its customary channels on matters of faith, in connection with religious services, does not participate or intervene in a political campaign under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). On 31 March 2026 the court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without reaching the merits, and the plaintiffs noticed an appeal on 22 April 2026.
  • AGR-5.3: USDA rules defining unfair practices under the Packers and Stockyards Act were proposed in 2010, limited by a 2011 appropriations rider, issued in 2016, withdrawn in 2017, finalized in 2020, expanded in 2024 and, for broiler grower payments, delayed in 2026 to December 31, 2027. Administrations and Congresses of both parties acted at each step, and White Houses of both parties described meat processing as insufficiently competitive in January 2022 and September 2026.
  • AGR-5.7: On July 16, 2026 the District of Minnesota certified four classes in the beef antitrust litigation, and the Eighth Circuit has agreed to review that certification. National Beef disclosed that DOJ told it in September 2025 that it was closing the federal investigation of fed cattle and beef packing markets, and that DOJ opened a new civil antitrust investigation in November 2025.
  • DEF-5.3: CBO estimated that in each year since 2006 more than $50 billion, on average, of funding designated for Overseas Contingency Operations supported enduring activities, and GAO found that the share DoD itself considers non-war rose from about 4 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 12 percent in fiscal year 2015.
  • DEF-5.4: In January 2017 GAO reported that DoD had an internal estimate of $20 to $30 billion in enduring costs funded through OCO and had not finalized it or reported it outside the department.
  • DEF-5.6: The 2022 PACT Act presumes exposure to burn-pit hazards for veterans who served at listed locations and presumes service connection for listed respiratory diseases and cancers without a service record of the disease.
  • POL-5.1: In Citizens United (2010) the Supreme Court held, 5 to 4, that independent expenditures by corporations do not give rise to corruption or its appearance, and held, 8 to 1, that the disclaimer and disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act are constitutional. In SpeechNow.org v. FEC (D.C. Circuit, en banc, 26 March 2010) the court held that contributions to groups making only independent expenditures cannot be limited and upheld the registration and reporting requirements for those groups.
  • POL-5.2: A 501(c)(4) social welfare organization may intervene in political campaigns if campaign activity is not its primary activity. No statute or regulation quantifies "primarily."
  • POL-5.3: Federal law does not require a 501(c)(4) to disclose its contributors' names to the public. Since Rev. Proc. 2018-38 (July 2018) and T.D. 9898 (28 May 2020), the organization also does not report contributor names and addresses to the IRS on Schedule B, and the IRS public data files show every Schedule B donor field as RESTRICTED.
  • POL-5.10: The D.C. Circuit held on 21 August 2020 that 11 CFR 109.10(e)(1)(vi), which limited disclosure of donors to independent expenditures to donations earmarked for a specific expenditure, conflicts with the statute. In Van Hollen v. FEC the district court held 11 CFR 104.20(c)(9), a purpose-based limit on electioneering-communication donor disclosure, contrary to the statute in 2012 and 2014, and the D.C. Circuit reversed on 18 September 2012 and 21 January 2016 and upheld the regulation.
  • REL-5.9: The CARES Act created the Paycheck Protection Program and passed the Senate 96 to 0 on 25 March 2020, and President Trump approved it on 27 March 2020. President Biden approved the PPP Extension Act on 30 March 2021. SBA proposed removing its religious-status exclusions on 19 January 2021 and removed paragraph (k) of 13 CFR 120.110 in a final rule of 30 June 2022.
  • DEF-6.2: The Church Committee concluded that intelligence activities undermined citizens' constitutional rights primarily because checks and balances had not been applied. Congress then created the Senate and House intelligence committees and enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, with a seven-judge court.
  • MED-6.4: Bayer spent $9.19 million on federal lobbying in 2025. Ballard Partners reported $97.27 million in lobbying income for the first three quarters of 2026, and $88.06 million for 2025, in its Lobbying Disclosure Act filings.
  • POL-6.19: The Podesta Group's FARA registration (no. 5926) was dated 1 April 2009 and terminated on 31 December 2017, with 33 foreign principals on the registration record. The firm reported $24.04 million in Lobbying Disclosure Act income for 2016 and $18.13 million for 2017.
  • POL-7.13: Congress created the State Department's Global Engagement Center in section 1287 of Pub. L. 114-328 (23 December 2016) to "recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts." On 16 April 2025 Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the closure of the office, by then named R/FIMI, saying it "spent millions of dollars to actively silence and censor the voices of Americans they were supposed to be serving." The statement cites no document or case.
  • POL-7.17: The House Select Committee to Investigate Foundations (Cox Committee) reported on 1 January 1953, with all six members signing, that very few actual Communists or Communist sympathizers had obtained positions of influence in foundations. The Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations (Reece Committee) reported in December 1954 on the votes of three Republicans, with both Democrats voting against it and writing that it "should never be published."
  • POL-8.2: Each Reserve Bank board has nine directors: three Class A chosen by and representing the stockholding banks, three Class B elected by the member banks to represent the public, and three Class C designated by the Board of Governors. Since the Dodd-Frank Act of 21 July 2010, the Class B and Class C directors appoint the Reserve Bank president, with Board approval, and the Class A directors take no part.
  • POL-8.3: A member bank must subscribe Reserve Bank stock equal to 6 percent of its paid-up capital and surplus, half paid in, and may not transfer or pledge it. Since 1 January 2016 a member bank above an inflation-adjusted $10 billion in assets (the Fed reports $12.8 billion for 2025) receives a cumulative dividend of the lesser of 6 percent and the 10-year Treasury high yield, and smaller banks receive 6 percent.
  • POL-8.4: GAO's Table 8 totals $16,115 billion of loans across the Fed's broad-based emergency programs by adding every renewal of overnight loans without adjusting for term, and GAO found that loans outstanding peaked above $1 trillion in late 2008. Senator Sanders's release of 21 July 2011 described the audit as uncovering "$16 trillion in secret loans."
  • POL-8.11: Section 4019 of the CARES Act, signed 27 March 2020, bars from section 4003 transactions any entity in which the President, Vice President, an executive department head, a Member of Congress or a family member holds at least 20 percent. Section 4019 does not address Federal Reserve vendors, and section 4026 requires the Board to report each new facility to Congress within seven days.
  • POL-8.12: On 7 April 2020 Senators Cramer and Cruz and 15 Republican colleagues asked that BlackRock act without regard to investment policies it adopted for its own funds. On 22 April 2020 Representatives Garcia, Tlaib, Pressley and six Democratic co-signers asked for the contracts, BlackRock's conflict policies and documents on how the programs affect BlackRock's own ETFs.

Exhibits naming this entity

  • Exhibit 249 10 January 2018. U.S. Government Accountability Office: Defense Budget: Obligations of Overseas Contingency Operations Funding for Operation and Maintenance Base Requirements, GAO-18-202R
  • Exhibit 252 10 August 2022. U.S. Congress: Public Law 117-168, Sergeant First Class Heath Robinson Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022
  • Exhibit 254 6 June 2022. Congressional Budget Office: Estimated Budgetary Effects of H.R. 3967, Honoring our PACT Act of 2021, as Passed by the House and as Amended by the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs
  • Exhibit 307 25 October 1978. United States Congress: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
  • Exhibit 381 7 August 1964. U.S. Congress: Joint Resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf Resolution, H.J. Res. 1145, Public Law 88-408)
  • Exhibit 395 11 February 2020. U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency Management: The Afghanistan Papers: Costs and Benefits of America's Longest War, S. Hrg. 116-203
  • Exhibit 413 as in force 2026. United States Congress (Internal Revenue Code): 26 U.S.C. § 508 (special rules for section 501(c)(3) organizations)
  • Exhibit 414 as in force 2026. United States Congress (Internal Revenue Code): 26 U.S.C. § 6033 (returns by exempt organizations)
  • Exhibit 415 1984; as in force 2026. United States Congress (Internal Revenue Code; added by Pub. L. 98-369 § 1033, 18 July 1984): 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (restrictions on church tax inquiries and examinations; Church Audit Procedures Act)
  • Exhibit 416 as in force 2026. United States Congress (Internal Revenue Code; clause added 1954): 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (exemption; political campaign clause, "Johnson Amendment")
  • Exhibit 420 23 June 1984. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee of Conference: Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Conference Report, H. Rept. 98-861 (church audits, title X, sec. 1033)
  • Exhibit 464 27 March 2020. U.S. Congress: CARES Act, Pub. L. 116-136, section 1102
  • Exhibit 465 25 March 2020. U.S. Senate: U.S. Senate Roll Call Vote 116-2-80, H.R. 748
  • Exhibit 466 30 March 2021. U.S. Congress: PPP Extension Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117-6
  • Exhibit 525 15 December 1791. United States Congress (ratified by the states 15 December 1791): First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
  • Exhibit 558 6 September 1958. U.S. Congress: Food Additives Amendment of 1958 (Public Law 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784)
  • Exhibit 613 18 November 2011. U.S. Congress: Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-55, Division A, sec. 721
  • Exhibit 618 1 June 2026. USDA Agricultural Marketing Service: Poultry Grower Payment Systems and Capital Improvement Systems; Delay of Effective Date (91 FR 32314)
  • Exhibit 622 12 May 2020. U.S. Senators (Fischer, Crapo, Daines, Jones, Enzi, Rounds, Hoeven, Smith, Cramer, Hyde-Smith and others): Letter from 19 U.S. Senators to Attorney General William Barr requesting a DOJ investigation of the cattle industry
  • Exhibit 666 4 July 2025. U.S. Congress (139 Stat. 72): Public Law 119-21 (H.R. 1), Title I, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (sections 10101 to 10607)
  • Exhibit 673 2026-11-09. U.S. Congress (Lobbying Disclosure Act database, lda.gov): Lobbying Disclosure Act query: quarterly reports with the phrase 'farm bill' in a lobbying activity description, 2018 and 2024 to 2025
  • Exhibit 674 11 October 2011. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (majority staff): Repatriating Offshore Funds: 2004 Tax Windfall for Select Multinationals
  • Exhibit 678 2026-11-10. U.S. Congress (Lobbying Disclosure Act database, lda.gov): Lobbying Disclosure Act API: filing counts by year and type
  • Exhibit 685 24 May 2010. U.S. Senate (Congressional Record vol. 156, no. 79): Congressional Record, Senate, 24 May 2010: motion to instruct conferees on H.R. 4173 (auto dealers), roll call vote 163
  • Exhibit 686 7 October 2004. U.S. House of Representatives (Clerk): House roll call 509, American Jobs Creation Act conference report, 7 October 2004
  • Exhibit 687 11 October 2004. U.S. Senate: Senate roll call vote 211, H.R. 4520 conference report (American Jobs Creation Act), 11 October 2004
  • Exhibit 693 September 2014. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Perspectives on Politics 12(3), pp. 564-581: Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens
  • Exhibit 694 December 2015. Peter K. Enns, Perspectives on Politics 13(4), pp. 1053-1064 (Reflections Symposium): Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation
  • Exhibit 695 December 2015. Peter K. Enns, Perspectives on Politics 13(4), pp. 1072-1074: Reconsidering the Middle: A Reply to Martin Gilens
  • Exhibit 696 December 2015. Martin Gilens, Perspectives on Politics 13(4), pp. 1065-1071: The Insufficiency of 'Democracy by Coincidence': A Response to Peter K. Enns
  • Exhibit 697 October-December 2015. Omar S. Bashir, Research & Politics 2(4), October-December 2015: Testing Inferences about American Politics: A Review of the 'Oligarchy' Result
  • Exhibit 698 April 2016. Martin Gilens, Research & Politics 3(2), April 2016: Simulating representation: The devil's in the detail
  • Exhibit 699 23 May 2016. Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, The Washington Post (Monkey Cage), 23 May 2016: Critics argued with our analysis of U.S. political inequality. Here are 5 ways they're wrong
  • Exhibit 700 2017. J. Alexander Branham, Stuart N. Soroka and Christopher Wlezien, Political Science Quarterly 132(1), pp. 43-62: When Do the Rich Win?
  • Exhibit 702 April 2020. Mads Andreas Elkjaer and Torben Iversen, World Politics 72(2), pp. 254-290: The Political Representation of Economic Interests: Subversion of Democracy or Middle-Class Supremacy?
  • Exhibit 703 June 2024. Mads Andreas Elkjaer and Michael Baggesen Klitgaard, Perspectives on Politics 22(2), pp. 318-337 (online 11 October 2021): Economic Inequality and Political Responsiveness: A Systematic Review
  • Exhibit 709 19 July 2008. Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech (manuscript hosted by the authors): Advocacy and Policy Change, pre-publication manuscript of Lobbying and Policy Change (19 July 2008)
  • Exhibit 710 2010. Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Politics & Society 38(2), pp. 152-204: Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States
  • Exhibit 711 September 2014. Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Perspectives on Politics 12(3), pp. 643-662: After the 'Master Theory': Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis
  • Exhibit 741 4 April 2012. U.S. Congress: Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Public Law 112-105 (S. 2038)
  • Exhibit 742 15 April 2013. U.S. Congress: Public Law 113-7 (S. 716), modifying online access to financial disclosure statements under the STOCK Act
  • Exhibit 743 Current text; codified by Pub. L. 117-286, 27 December 2022. Office of the Law Revision Counsel (via Cornell LII): 5 U.S.C. 13106, Failure to file or filing false reports (Ethics in Government Act, former s.104)
  • Exhibit 761 December 2004. Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd and Ziobrowski, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39(4):661-676: Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate
  • Exhibit 762 April 2011. Ziobrowski, Boyd, Cheng and Ziobrowski, Business and Politics 13(1):1-22: Abnormal Returns From the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives
  • Exhibit 763 April 2013. Eggers and Hainmueller, Journal of Politics 75(2):535-551: Capitol Losses: The Mediocre Performance of Congressional Stock Portfolios
  • Exhibit 764 April 2020. Belmont, Sacerdote, Sehgal and Van Hoek, NBER: Relief Rally: Senators as Feckless as the Rest of Us at Stock Picking (NBER Working Paper 26975)
  • Exhibit 765 March 2022. Belmont, Sacerdote, Sehgal and Van Hoek, Journal of Public Economics 207:104602: Do senators and house members beat the stock market? Evidence from the STOCK Act
  • Exhibit 766 January 2019. Serkan Karadas, The Financial Review 54(1):85-131: Trading on Private Information: Evidence from Members of Congress
  • Exhibit 767 November 2017. Hall, Karadas and Schlosky, Journal of Financial Economic Policy 9(4):450-474: Abnormal returns from joining Congress? Evidence from new members
  • Exhibit 768 2018 working paper. Huang and Xuan, SMU and UC Irvine: 'Trading' Political Favors: Evidence from the Impact of the STOCK Act (working paper)
  • Exhibit 769 November 2025. Wei and Zhou, NBER: "Captain Gains" on Capitol Hill (NBER Working Paper 34524)
  • Exhibit 770 April 2026. Chen and Sacerdote, NBER: Capital in the Capitol: Congressional Trades Resemble Uninformed Retail Trading (NBER Working Paper 35041)
  • Exhibit 772 11 April 2013. CQ Roll Call: Senate quietly curtails STOCK Act reporting for staff
  • Exhibit 776 22 July 2026. Clerk of the House of Representatives: Roll call 280, H.R. 7008, Stop Insider Trading Act, On Passage
  • Exhibit 777 30 September 2026. U.S. Senate: Roll call vote 253, cloture on the motion to proceed to H.R. 7008
  • Exhibit 778 22 July 2026. CQ Roll Call: Congressional stock-trading bill passes the House
  • Exhibit 782 21 July 2010. U.S. Congress: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, sections 1103, 1107 and 1109
  • Exhibit 783 4 December 2015. U.S. Congress: Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, Public Law 114-94, section 32203 (dividends of Federal reserve banks)
  • Exhibit 795 27 March 2020. U.S. Congress: Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Public Law 116-136, sections 4003, 4019, 4020 and 4026
  • Exhibit 796 7 April 2020. U.S. Senate (Cramer, Cruz and 15 colleagues): Letter from Senators Cramer, Cruz and 15 Republican colleagues to Secretary Mnuchin and Chairman Powell on CARES Act implementation
  • Exhibit 797 22 April 2020. U.S. House of Representatives (Garcia, Tlaib, Pressley and co-signers): Letter from Reps. Garcia, Tlaib, Pressley and six Democratic co-signers to Secretary Mnuchin and Chairman Powell on BlackRock's contracts with the Fed
  • Exhibit 863 2 January 2013. U.S. Congress: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 112-239, sec. 1078 (Dissemination Abroad of Information About the United States)
  • Exhibit 868 23 December 2016. U.S. Congress: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. 114-328, sec. 1287 (Global Engagement Center)
  • Exhibit 875 1 January 1953. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee to Investigate Foundations: Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate Foundations and Other Organizations, H. Rept. 2514, 82d Cong., 2d sess.
  • Exhibit 876 December 1954. U.S. House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations: Tax-Exempt Foundations: Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, H. Rept. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d sess.
  • Exhibit 883 as in force 2026. United States Congress: 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (publicity of information required from certain exempt organizations)
  • Exhibit 888 18 December 2015. United States Congress: Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. 114-113, sec. 127 (Financial Services and General Government)
  • Exhibit 893 as in force 2026. United States Congress: 52 U.S.C. § 30104 (reporting requirements), subsections (c) and (f)
  • Exhibit 991 8 May 2008. U.S. House of Representatives: Opening statement of Hon. Bart Stupak, “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Marketing, Education, or Deception?” (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce)
  • Exhibit 999 12 July 1943. U.S. Congress: National War Agencies Appropriation Act, 1944, ch. 228, 57 Stat. 494 (Office of War Information, 57 Stat. 531-532)
  • Exhibit 1000 27 January 1948. U.S. Congress: United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Smith-Mundt Act), Pub. L. 80-402, 62 Stat. 6
  • Exhibit 1001 16 August 1985. U.S. Congress: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. 99-93, sec. 208 (Ban on domestic activities by the USIA)
  • Exhibit 1009 21 October 1998. U.S. Congress: Drug-Free Media Campaign Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, div. D, title I, subtitle A (112 Stat. 2681-752 to 2681-753)
  • Exhibit 1067 1979. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations: Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, Findings (Section I)
  • Exhibit 1234 16 January 1883. United States Congress: An Act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States (Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act), 22 Stat. 403
  • Exhibit 1235 12 July 1974. United States Congress: National Research Act, Pub. L. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342, section 212 (Institutional Review Boards)
  • Exhibit 1236 26 October 2001. United States Congress: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. 107-56, section 218
  • Exhibit 1257 17 December 2004. U.S. Congress: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, sec. 1011
  • Exhibit 1268 30 September 2022. U.S. Congress: Continuing Appropriations and Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. 117-180, Division F (FDA User Fee Reauthorization Act of 2022), sec. 1005
  • Exhibit 1269 29 December 2022. U.S. Congress: Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. 117-328, Div. FF (Food and Drug Omnibus Reform Act of 2022), sec. 3210, Modernizing accelerated approval
  • Exhibit 1288 run 10 November 2026. U.S. Congress (Lobbying Disclosure Act database, lda.gov); query by Lacuna: Lobbying Disclosure Act filings: Ballard Partners (registrant 401104288), all LD-2 and registration filings, 2017 to third quarter 2026
  • Exhibit 1289 run 10 November 2026. Lacuna derivation from the Lobbying Disclosure Act database (lda.gov REST API): Dataset: Lobbying Disclosure Act LD-2 income by registrant, pool of large firms, 2016, 2017, 2021, 2024, 2025 and 2026 (Q1 to Q3), with single-quarter snapshots